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Foreword 
 
 
 
Each year the Centre for Monetary Economics (CME) at The Department of Economics, BI 
Norwegian School of Management appoints an independent group of experts to evaluate 
monetary policy in Norway.  
 This year the committee consists of Hilde Bjørnland, professor of Economics at BI, Richard 
Clarida, professor of Economics at Columbia University, Elisabeth Holvik, Chief Economist 
at Sparebank1 Group, and Erling Steigum, professor of Economics at BI. The committee is 
solely responsible for the report and the views therein. The report does not necessarily 
represent the views of the CME or of its members. 
The Ministry of Finance partly funds the Norges Bank Watch reports, which contain useful 
information and analyses for the Ministry’s evaluation of monetary policy that is presented 
each year in a White Paper to Parliament.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Oslo, 18 February 2010 
 
Centre for Monetary Economics 
 
Arne Jon Isachsen 
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Executive summary 
 
 
The Great Recession 
 
The international recession triggered by the financial crisis is often called “The Great 
Recession” because it is the deepest after World War II, and it did not turn into a full scale 
depression like in the 1930s. An evaluation of Norges Bank’s monetary policy in 2009 must 
therefore acknowledge the extraordinary uncertainty about the international economy facing 
Norges Bank, as well as the above-normal challenges of making forecast of the domestic 
business cycle and inflation when setting the key policy rate. 
 
Fortunately, the recession in Norway turned out to be much milder than in most other OECD-
countries. This is probably both a result of good macroeconomic policies, good financial 
regulation, and good luck. Monetary policy has been very expansionary since December 
2008. Furthermore, the effects of monetary policy on aggregate demand are probably greater 
in Norway than in most other European countries due to the combination of large household 
indebtedness and floating mortgage rates. Fiscal policy also became much more expansionary 
in 2009 on top of the effects of automatic fiscal stabilisers. Good policies and conservative 
financial regulation are also – at least partly – factors that explain why there has been neither 
banking crisis, nor severe problems in any Norwegian bank in 2009. The international 
financial crisis did temporarily cut off many Norwegian banks from international funding, but 
this problem was manageable, and was fixed without any sizeable credit crunch. Finally it 
was good luck that the oil price (in USD) doubled in the course of 2009 and that the 
Norwegian manufacturing sector is relatively small, quite capital intensive, and not much 
involved in producing consumer durables. 
 
A comparison of the forecasts by Norges Bank with those by Statistics Norway show that 
already in the beginning of 2009, both institutions quickly understood that the Norwegian 
recession would be much milder than the great international recession. However, there has 
been a clear (and to us surprising) tendency that Statistics Norway forecast a persistently 
lower inflation than Norges Bank for the period 2009 – 2011.    
 
 
Monetary policy in 2009 
 
The committee has evaluated monetary policy in the first half of 2009 as being part of the 
Norwegian authorities’ management efforts to counter the negative effects of the financial 
crisis on the Norwegian economy. These were followed by an “exit strategy” phase in which 
Norges Bank began to signal a return to higher rates, as it scaled back the crisis measures and 
eventually started to hike rates in October. The central bank’s rhetoric and actions in the 
period since the August interest rate meeting have been part of this exit strategy, in our view.  
 
From a peak of 5.75 per cent in the summer of 2008, Norges Bank’s policy rate was lowered 
in stages to 1.25 per cent by June 2009. In February, March and May, the policy rate was cut 
by 50 basis points each time, whereas the last rate cut in June was 0.25 percentage points. 
Between the release of the Monetary Policy Report (MPR2/09) and the final rate cut down to 
1.25 per cent in June and the next Executive Board policy meeting in August, the rhetoric 
coming from Norges Bank saw a marked change. In fact, as early as 12 August, the date of 
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the meeting, Norges Bank hinted that it was getting ready to hike rates in the near future due 
to stronger-than-expected developments. 
 
After evaluating Norges Banks monetary policy, the committee considers Norges Banks 
assessment of the Norwegian economy over all to be well balanced in the first half of 2009. 
The two rate cuts in February and March reflected well the deterioration of the outlook of the 
Norwegian economy.  
 
The largest controversy regarding monetary policy in 2009 was probably the rate cut in June, 
and to a lesser extent in May. By then, the economy had begun showing signs of 
improvement, the government’s expansionary fiscal policy was just starting to have an 
impact, and the financial markets had improved rapidly on the back of lower interest rates, 
government guarantees and ample liquidity. Along with the strong signs that the economy 
was improving, there were growing concerns that the extraordinarily low interest rates could 
initiate a housing market bubble. House prices started to increase already in January 2009, 
and have continued to climb gradually back to their pre-crisis levels. 
 
Some leading indicators and the strong recovery of financial and asset markets suggested an 
earlier recovery than what Norges Bank emphasized at that time. The rate cut in May, and 
more notably in June, therefore raised some concern in the private sector. The upward 
revision of the projected output gaps and inflation in 2010 and 2011 should in normal times 
rather indicate higher interest rates. However, given the unusually high uncertainty about the 
economic outlook at the time, and the exceptionally low interest rate level abroad, the 
committee does not find the rate cuts inappropriate. 
 
Up until its August meeting, Norges Bank had clearly pursued interest rate easing cycle. The 
August meeting represented a sharp change in rhetoric as Norges Bank indicated it would 
probably hike rates earlier than it had indicated in its June meeting. By August, the turning 
point had been moved to the third quarter of 2009, with an output gap of -1 per cent and a 
corresponding upwards adjustment of the forecasted interest rate path for 2010. This change 
in stance from June to August was to some extent anticipated by private sector as the rate cuts 
in June and to some extent in May were not fully priced in the market.  
 
After the August meeting, Norges Bank communicated clearly its intention to start its exit 
strategy. Norges Bank wanted to withdraw the extraordinary measures first and then hike 
rates. On October 28, Norges Bank hiked rates by 25 basis points to 1.5 per cent and signalled 
that rates would be hiked by a further 25 basis points either in December 2009 or February 
2010. Due to strong economic data, recovering financial markets, rising house prices and a 
lack of pass-through from the previous policy rate hikes to mortgage and corporate rates, 
Norges Bank hiked rates in December by 25 basis points to 1.75 per cent.  
 
The committee would like to give Norges Bank credit for a quick and successful 
communication to the private sector when Norges Bank changed its view on the outlook for 
the Norwegian economy in August.  
In the committee’s view, the October rate hike reflected well the more optimistic outlook of 
the Norwegian economy signaled by Norges Bank since August. Although the rate hike in 
December was somewhat surprising to the private sector, the committee believes it was 
appropriate to increase rates due to the lack of pass-through of the previous rate hike to bank 
lending rates and a more favorable outlook of the economy.  
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During 2009 Norges Bank has given the housing market a great deal of attention in speeches, 
interviews and other communication. We have interpreted the various statements over the 
year as a gradual process in which Norges Bank at the end of the year put more weight on the 
role of house prices in increasing private demand than earlier. This does not mean that Norges 
Bank is targeting house prices in itself, but rather that sharp movements in house prices gives 
valuable information about the outlook for aggregate demand. The committee believes it to be 
appropriate for Norges Bank to put some more weight on rapid rising asset prices in monetary 
policy. 
 
 
Credibility and transparency 
 
One important implication of having an inflation targeting Central Bank is that current 
economic behaviour will depend on expectations about monetary policy. The credibility and 
transparency of the central bank therefore becomes extremely important.  
 
Norges Bank has the last few years approached the frontier in monetary policy transparency 
by publishing the projected interest rate path. Since the effect of a monetary policy decision 
depends on expected future decisions, the projected policy path is an integral part of the 
monetary policy stance.  
 
The projected interest rate path, as well as the forecast of the other macroeconomic variables, 
are updated and published in the monetary policy reports three times a year. Norges Bank has 
argued against writing a report every quarter, as it leaves very little time for the staff to digest 
new information and conduct thorough analyses. Yet, Norges Bank Executive Board meets 
eight times a year. Only on the three occasions that they publish the Monetary Policy report 
do they update the forecasts. The exception was in December 2008, when the unexpected 
depth of the financial crisis required new forecast for the expected policy stance.  
 
The NBW committee suggests that Norges Bank keeps the number of monetary policy reports 
to three per year, but consider publishing a press release and a monetary policy update at least 
on one of the other meetings of the Executive Board. The monetary policy update should 
contain a limited number of forecasts for central macroeconomic variables.  
 
Norges Bank has decided not to publish minutes. Rather than voting they have a “collegial”, 
monetary policy committee, where the members of the Executive Boards make unanimous 
decisions. We suggest that non-attributed minutes should be published, in order to strengthen 
the accountability and further improve transparency. These minutes could note without 
attribution to individual members which issues were discussed and what arguments were 
presented, as well as how (if) individual members have voted.  
 
Non-attributed minutes will reveal the scope and depth of the policy discussion, but do not 
identify the individual contributions of the members. Even to publish the voting patterns 
(without identifying individual votes) would be useful, as it provides an indication of the 
degree of disagreement and/or uncertainty among the members, which helps the private sector 
to more efficiently learn the monetary policy reaction function.  
 
Currently, Norges Bank has decided to “speak with only one voice”. This has implied that 
only internal members (the Governor and Deputy Governor) have discussed the monetary 
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policy decisions or issues related to the operation of monetary policy in public. We suggest 
that also the external members should be able to discuss issues related to the operation of 
monetary policy in public. This would contribute positively to the current debates about 
monetary policymaking in Norway.    
 
 
Fiscal policy – challenges for monetary policy 
 
Norway’s situation as a small open economy makes it particularly important that there is a 
commitment to a credible rule for fiscal policy. Without such commitment, the Norwegian 
fiscal discipline may wear down, leading to rent seeking activities, excessive government 
spending and an increase in wages. This may put upward pressure on the interest rates and the 
exchange rate, leading to deterioration of industries exposed to international competition.  
 
In general, good coordination of monetary and fiscal policy can be achieved by placing each 
within a decision framework focusing each on medium-term objectives and making those 
objectives and related actions transparent and predictable. In this way, fiscal actions can take 
full account of the likely monetary-policy response, and vice versa. 
 
Norges Bank has been clear in arguing that a precondition for effective interaction between 
monetary and fiscal policy is that decision-making bodies recognize how their decisions will 
affect each other. In the absence of such recognition, discretionary fiscal policy can create 
tensions in the monetary policymaking in Norway. If fiscal policy stays on its current track, 
we are concerned it would represent a considerable challenge to Norges Bank.  
 
 
Asset prices and monetary policy – implications for Norway 
 
As the world economy appears to be emerging from the worst financial crisis and deepest, 
most synchronized global slump in 75 years, policymakers, regulators, and academics are 
focusing intensely and appropriately on ‘lesson to be learned’, with particular attention paid to 
how movements in asset prices should influence the conduct of monetary policy. In the years 
leading up to the crisis, there had developed a broad consensus among monetary policy 
makers on the role that asset prices should play in an inflation targeting strategy. According to 
this consensus, asset prices will affect monetary policy to the extent that they are deemed to 
affect the forecasts of the central bank’s target variables that is, inflation and the output gap. 
A central bank following this approach may well wish to lean against swings in asset prices, 
but only if these swings influence the forecast of inflation or possibly, the output gap. 
 
Experts at the Bank for International Settlements had for some years have offered critiques of 
this consensus and since the crisis, have called for major changes in it. According to this 
critique, the focus on inflation and output stabilization resulted in a path for interest rates that 
might not sufficiently reflect the dangers that arise when an asset price boom is coupled with 
a credit boom. The focus on price stability meant that they ignored the very real, systemic 
threats arising from credit and asset price booms that had been building during the ‘Great 
Moderation’.  
 
Recent research by the IMF sheds light on the information role that asset prices and quantities 
have provided in previous housing and stock market busts since 1970. The study confirms the 
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valuable information content contained in data on credit flows, economic activity in the 
construction sector, and current account imbalances. However, at the same time IMF also 
pointed out that the ability to predict house price busts over a three year window can be 
difficult. At most only half the time in the IMF panel do the best indicator variables actually 
correctly signal an asset price bust within one to three years. Policymakers will in practice 
have to think carefully about an aggressive hike in interest rates solely to prevent an asset 
price bubble from forming given just 50-50 chance that the signal of a bubble is correct.  
 
Each country, including Norway, will have to assess how best to design and implement 
systemic regulatory authority in the wake of the financial crisis. In Norway, the responsibility 
for financial stability is divided between the Ministry of Finance, Finanstilsynet and Norges 
Bank. Norges Bank publishes its assessment of the outlook for financial stability in semi-
annual reports. In addition the Bank holds meetings with Finanstilsynet and the Ministry of 
Finance to discuss the status of the financial system and the need for government measures. 
  
The committee believes that Norges Bank should continue and enhance its responsibility for 
analyzing, reporting, and communicating information about significant interactions between 
and risks among financial institutions, as part of its  Financial Stability Report. By having 
regular meetings with Finanstilsynet and the Ministry of Finance, it will enhance and 
contribute to the macro prudential supervision in Norway. 
 
 
The forecasting process – models and judgement 
 
Since November 2005, all macroeconomic forecasts from Norges Bank have been based on 
their own predictions regarding expected future interest rate setting. This forecasting analysis 
makes use of a structural model (NEMO), but this model is primarily suited for medium term 
analysis of the effects of monetary policy on the macroeconomy. Norges Bank’s forecasts for 
the first few quarters are largely based on current statistics, information from Norges Bank’s 
regional network and forecasts obtained from a number of short-term statistical and 
econometric models. The published projections in the monetary policy reports are the result of 
an overall assessment based on both models and judgment. 
 
The analytical work conducted in Norges Bank is impressive, drawing on high level skills in 
diverse areas such as economic theory, statistics, econometrics, mathematics and 
programming techniques.  
 
 
Indicators of underlying inflation 
Consumer price inflation varies from month to month, sometimes substantially due to 
extraordinary fluctuations in certain product markets or changes in taxes and subsidies. 
Norges Bank’s mandate therefore opens up for ignoring extraordinary consumer price 
disturbances when setting the interest rate, by focusing on a measure of so-called underlying 
inflation. 
 
In 2008, Norges Bank introduced a new indicator of underlying inflation called CPIXE. 
CPIXE measures CPI inflation adjusted for tax changes and excluding temporary fluctuations 
in energy prices. The motivation for constructing CPIXE is that the previous measure of 
underlying inflation (CPI-ATE) does not capture trends in energy prices, since CPI-ATE 
permanently excludes energy.  
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By focusing on CPIXE instead of CPI-ATE, Norges Bank has introduced a new main 
indicator of underlying inflation that they are targeting in their forecasting process. CPIXE is 
now the only measure of underlying inflation for which they provide conditioned, detailed 
forecast.  
 
A major concern with CPIXE is that the historical index values will be revised as new 
observations of energy prices are added to the sample. In periods with rapid changes in oil 
prices, this revision can be substantial. In their monetary policy reports, Norges Bank does not 
update the data for CPIXE as it is revised. Hence, the effect of the revisions will be 
suppressed. If Norges Bank continues to publish CPIXE in their monetary policy reports, we 
recommend that the final numbers are published as they are revised, not the real time values. 
Given that the final revised values of CPIXE will always be uncertain by construction, Norges 
Bank should also extend the fan charts back in time to reflect this uncertainty.  
 
Relying too much on CPIXE as the main indicator of underlying inflation could make 
monetary policy less robust, since historical data are revised as new observations becomes 
available. Furthermore, since the construction of CPIXE involves judgment and revision of 
history, it does not make it a transparent indicator that Norges Bank should use as its main 
indicator. Our view is that CPI-ATE should still be used as the focus measure, but that Norges 
Bank can use more judgment vis-à-vis CPI-ATE in times of rapid oil price increase/decreases.  
 
 
Regional Network 
Norges Bank has established a regional network of enterprises, organizations and local 
authorities throughout Norway. The insight from the network is an important factor in 
decision-making by Norges Bank’s Executive Board in its conduct of monetary policy. We 
find that there is clearly useful information in the regional networks in assessing current 
macroeconomic conditions. In that sense, it provides a signal about developments in the 
Norwegian economy before data is published and we recommend that Norges Bank continues 
to develop and refine the network. However, the ability of the network to forecast aggregate 
economic activity 3-6 months ahead is less clear, as it seems to be a coincident rather than 
leading indicator. Given the amount of resources that are put into constructing the indicator, 
we suggest that the forecasting power of the regional network is systematically assessed and 
compared to other leading indicators such as Statistic Norway business tendency survey. 
 
 
Short term forecasting 
Norges Bank has the last few years developed and implemented forecasting methods of model 
combinations used in the monetary policy operations. These forecasts are unconditional 
forecasts. At the heart of the evaluation and combination of short-term forecasts is a set of 
programs collectively referred to as SAM – the System for Averaging Models. This work is 
encouraging and we recommend that Norges Bank continues to develop, test and evaluate 
these forecasting tools both for point forecast and densities. Furthermore, as last years Norges 
Bank Watch group, we recommend that Norges Bank publishes the short term forecast 
regularly, at least after each monetary policy meeting.  
 
We also suggest that the forecast horizon be extended to 2-3 years.  The forecasts can be 
published together with the regular forecast update from NEMO. In that way the 
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unconditional forecast from SAM can serve as useful cross checks for the forecast from 
NEMO, which are conditional on the interest rate path.  
 
 
The structural model 
The last few years, Norges Bank has made impressive progress in developing a small 
structural model, called NEMO. The model has been in use for policy analysis and forecasting 
since the Monetary Policy Report 3/07.  
 
We support Norges Bank’s efforts to build a theoretically consistent structural model of the 
Norwegian economy, for evaluating monetary policy alternatives in the medium and long 
term. However, the recent financial crisis has highlighted some severe deficiencies in NEMO 
and many other DSGE models with respect to credit markets and asset prices, resulting in  
forecast failures.  
 
To strengthen its forecast properties, we recommend that Norges Bank should use empirically 
validated econometric models systematically as cross checks when making forecast from 
NEMO. This will offer transparency about the models strengths and weaknesses. 
 
We also suggest that leverage ratios and credit spreads are key variables in the monetary 
transmission mechanism that need to be modeled to assess the impact of different policy paths 
on the economy as well as how shocks to the financial sector generate fluctuations in inflation 
and the output gap.    
 
Currently NEMO does not include oil prices. However, oil price changes may have large 
wealth effects that are likely to influence consumption and investment. Furthermore, since oil 
revenue now constitutes a large component of total government income, fiscal policy will be 
affected in the long run by changes in the oil price. We therefore suggest that Norges Bank 
considers whether oil prices could make an useful contribution to the current model. 
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1. Introduction 
 
This report, Norges Bank Watch 2010, is an evaluation of the conduct of monetary policy in 
Norway in 2009. This report will not evaluate the institutional framework for monetary 
policy. Like previous Norges Bank Watch reports, we adopt the ex-ante rather than the ex-
post perspective, i.e. our assessment of the conduct of monetary policy is solely based on the 
information available when decisions were made, not data and information that became 
known afterwards.  
 
Professor Richard Clarida, University of Columbia has written Chapter 6 (Asset prices and 
monetary policy: Implications for Norway), and contributed to Chapter 7.5 (Financial 
frictions). 
 
The committee for Norges Bank Watch 2009 met in Oslo on three occasions during the period 
from September 2009 to February 2010. On 5 November and 17 December 2009 we had 
meetings with the management of Norges Bank. The committee has also had meetings with 
the Ministry of Finance (6 November 2009), with representatives of Statistics Norway 
(December 8, 2009) and with The Financial Supervisory Authority of Norway 
(Finanstilsynet) 17 December. We wish to thank Norges Bank for supplying us with useful 
data.  
 
The committee would also like to thank Petra Geraats, Arne Jon Isachsen, Steinar Juel, Kai 
Leitemo and Bjørn-Roger Wilhelmsen for constructive comments. The responsibility for 
errors and omissions rests solely with the committee, however. 
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2. The Great Recession 
 
The year 2009 has been extremely challenging for central banks and governments around the 
world. The uncertainty facing Norges Bank and most other central banks during 2009 was 
clearly much higher than normal. During November and December 2008, news about the 
dramatic effects of the global financial crisis on industrial production and world trade 
triggered a substantial downward revision of the growth and employment forecasts of 
Mainland Norway for 2009 and 2010 as well. To evaluate Norges Bank’s monetary policy 
decisions in 2009, therefore, it is both important to acknowledge the extraordinary 
uncertainties about developments in international financial markets and the international 
economy, as well as evaluating the business cycle forecasts on which Norges Bank’s 
monetary policy decisions in 2009 were based. 
 
 
2.1. Forecasting the Great Recession 
The year 2009 turned out to be an exceptionally challenging year for the world economy, 
particulary for the OECD-countries. In the latest OECD Economic Outlook of 2009, the 
decline in aggregate output from 2008 to 2009 was forecasted to be 2.5 per cent in the US, 4 
per cent in the Euro Area and 5.3 per cent in Japan. It could have been worse, however. In the 
first quarter of 2009, many forecasters feared that the recession would be deeper and more 
long lasting than what most forecasters think now. Last spring some would not even exclude 
the possibility of a full scale depression with deflation in the OECD area. Now, the consensus 
is that this is very unlikely to happen. During the summer and fall of 2009, new information 
suggested that the decline in aggregate output came to a halt and output was probably growing 
in the third and fourth quarter of 2009 in the US and Euro Area.  
 
The recession in 2009, which started in the third or fourth quarter of 2008 in most 
industrialised countries (but earlier in the US), is going to be the deepest in the OECD area 
since 1945. Naming it “The Great Recession” therefore seems appropriate, see Termin (2010). 
 
Table 2.1 looks at how Norges Bank, Statistics Norway, the IMF and OECD adjusted their 
Euro area output forecasts for 2009 and 2010 from the autumn of 2008 and during the year 
2009. The table shows that both Norges Bank and Statistics Norway revised their forecasts 
downward considerably between the autumn of 2008 and February/March of 2009. The 
forecast were revised down even further in May/June, before they became slightly more 
optimistic in the autumn. They were also more pessimistic than OECD and IMF forecast, 
except at the end of the year. Although not displayed here, a very similar pattern applies to the 
US output growth forecast for 2009 by Norges Bank and Statistics Norway. This suggests a 
strong tendency for institutions to herd when making forecasts of international business 
cycles. In retrospect, both Statistics Norway and Norges Bank probably had a gloomier 
picture of the great recession in May/June than what will materialize, but the final answer to 
this question lies in the future. 
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Table 2.1. Forecasts of GDP growth rates in the Euro area in 2009 and 2010 by different 
institutions on four different occasions in 2008 and 2009. 
 
Growth rate in 2009  
(per cent) 
OECD IMF Statistics 
Norway 
Norges Bank 
 
October/December 2008 
February/March 2009 
May/June 2009 
October/December 2009 
 
 
-0,6 
-0.6 
-4.1 
-4.0 
 
-0,5 
-2.0 
-4.2 
-4.2 
 
-0,9 
-3.5 
-4.9 
-4.0 
 
0 
-3.25 
-4.5 
-4.0 
Growth rate in 2010 
(per cent) 
OECD IMF Statistics 
Norway 
Norges Bank 
 
October/December 2008 
February/March 2009 
May/June 2009 
October/December 2009 
 
 
1.2 
-0.3 
0.9 
 
 
 
0.2 
-0.4 
0.3 
 
0 
-0.7 
-0.8 
0.8 
 
 
1,75* 
0 
0 
0.5 
Source: Statistics Norway: Økonomiske analyser 1/2009 (19 February), 3/2009 (27 May) and 
6/2009 (1 December). Norges Bank: Monetary policy reports 1/09 (19 March), 2/09 (11 June) 
and 3/09 (22 October).  
*Average of growth rates in 2010 and 2011. 
 
Table 2.1 also shows that both Norges Bank and Statistics Norway have revised their output 
growth forecast for the Euro area in 2010 upwards in October/November of 2009. Statistics 
Norway was more pessimistic than the other three institutions in the first quarter of the year 
and early summer, but raised its forecast considerably in October/December, and became 
slightly more optimistic than Norges Bank in the end. All four institutions now expect a 
positive growth rate in the Euro area in 2010. Again, the differences in the forecasts across 
these four institutions are small. 
 
 
2.1. The mild Norwegian recession 
Recent data strongly suggests that the recession in Norway is significantly milder than in the 
Euro area and in the US. According to forecast by Statistics Norway in early December 2008, 
Mainland output growth rate was expected to decline from 2.2 per cent in 2008 to -1.1 per 
cent in 2009, followed by 2.2 per cent growth in 2010, see Table 2.2 below.  
 
The relatively mild recession in Norway compared to the great international recession is 
probably a combined result of good macroeconomic policies, good financial regulation, and 
good luck. As emphasized in Chapter 3 of this report, monetary policy has been very 
expansionary since December 2008, and the effects of monetary policy on aggregate demand 
are probably greater in Norway than in most other European countries due to the combination 
of large household indebtedness and floating mortgage rates. In addition Norway has in the 
downturn benefited from having a large public sector and strong automatic fiscal policy 
stabilizers. On top of aggressive rate cuts, a considerable discretionary shift in fiscal policy 
was enacted in February.  Good policies and strict financial regulations are also – at least 
partly – factors that explain why there has been neither a general banking crisis, nor severe 
problems in any Norwegian bank in 2009. The international financial crisis did temporarily 
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cut off many Norwegian banks from international funding, but this problem was manageable 
for the authorities, and was dealt with without incurring a credit crunch. Finally, it was good 
luck that the oil price doubled in the course of 2009 and that Norway’s manufacturing sector 
is relatively small, quite capital intensive, and not much involved in producing consumer 
durables. Also, a temporarily weakening of the external value of the Norwegian krone, made 
life easier for producers of tradeables. Thus, Norway enjoyed a substantial current account 
surplus, a fairly small decline in employment, and relatively low unemployment in 2009. In 
fact, the increase in unemployment in Norway has been much less dramatic than in small, 
European countries with a large industrial base, such as Sweden and Finland.  
 
Still, the implications of the great, international recession and the domestic macroeconomic 
policy responses have opened up a very visible gap between a large booming sector producing 
non-tradeables, fuelled by booming house prices, private consumption and public spending, 
and a relatively small and declining, non-oil tradeable sector. Due to Norway’s large export 
revenues from petroleum, it has been possible for the government to undertake ambitious 
counter-cyclical fiscal and monetary policies measures, while at the same time enjoying 
considerable public sector surpluses as well as huge surpluses on the current account of the 
balance of payments in 2009.     
 
Figure 2.1 indicates that private consumption has been leading mainland GDP during the 
recession and recent recovery. Real private consumption fell four quarters in a row, starting in 
the second quarter of 2008. It recovered strongly in the second and third quarter of 2009, 
growing by more than one per cent in each quarter on a q/q basis. Real mainland GDP started 
its decline in the third quarter of 2008. The decline in output was smaller in the first quarter of 
2009 than in the last quarter of 2008, and in the second and third quarters of 2009, mainland 
output has been growing along with real private consumption. 
 
 
Figure 2.1 Quarterly growth rates in mainland GDP and private consumption, 2005:1 – 
2009:3 (seasonally adjusted data). 
 
Source: Statistics Norway 
 
There can be little doubt that the tight monetary policy in the year before the global financial 
crisis was an important factor behind the decline in private consumption starting in spring of 
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2008, half a year before the financial turmoil erupted in September and October. This policy 
had substantial effects on real interest rates and house prices. After monetary policy was 
vigorously eased in the fourth quarter of 2008, the house price decline stopped and was 
reversed in January 2009 (see Figure 2.2).  
 
 
Figure 2.2 Real house prices, deflated by CPI. Index. 1995 Q1 =100 
 
 
Source: Norges Bank 
 
 
Figure 2.3 Unemployment and gross unemployment rates. Registered (totally) unemployed, 
excluding or including individuals and participants in labour market measures, 2001-2009 
(per cent of labor force).  
 
Source: The Norwegian Public Labour and Welfare Service (NAV) and Statistics Norway 
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Recent unemployment data suggest that the latest recession will have a much smaller negative 
impact on the labour market than the recession in 1988-1989, see Figure 2.2. The gross 
unemployment rate, including participants in labour market measures, increased to more than 
5 per cent in 1989 and peaked at more than 8 per cent in 1993. The 2009 observation involves 
a rate of gross unemployment of only 3.7 per cent in 2009.  
 
 
2.2. Norges Bank’s forecasts of the real economy and inflation 
Table 2.2 compares the 2009 and 2010 forecast of mainland GDP and private consumption by 
Norges Bank with those from Statistics Norway. It is interesting how little these forecasts 
have changed throughout 2009. In the first quarter of 2009, both institutions appear to have 
developed a realistic picture of a relatively mild recession in Norway in 2009 compared to the 
great international recession.  
 
In February/March, Statistics Norway was slightly more pessimistic than Norges Bank, but in 
May/June the roles were reversed. Still, these differences between the forecasts of the two 
institutions are not large in relation to the normal adjustments of preliminary national 
accounts data. 
 
 
Table 2.2. Forecasts of mainland GDP and real private consumption growth rates by Norges 
Bank and Statistics Norway for 2009 and 2010 on four different occasions in late 2008 and in 
2009.  
 Mainland GDP growth rate, 
(per cent), 2009 
Private consumption growth 
rate (per cent), 2009 
 Norges Bank Statistics 
Norway 
Norges Bank Statistics 
Norway 
 
October/December 2008 
February/March 2009 
May/June 2009 
October/December 2009 
 
0.25 
-1.0 
-1.5 
-1.25 
 
 
-0.4 
-1.7 
-1.4 
-1.1 
 
0,75 
0 
-0.25 
0 
 
-1,0 
-0.4 
0.4 
0.2 
 Mainland GDP growth rate 
(per cent), 2010 
Private consumption growth 
rate (per cent), 2010 
 Norges Bank Statistics 
Norway 
Norges Bank Statistics 
Norway 
 
October/December 2008 
February/March 2009 
May/June 2009 
October/December 2009 
 
 
2,5 
2.5 
2.5 
2.75 
 
1,0 
0.9 
1.0 
2.2 
 
3,0 
5.25 
5.25 
5.5 
 
2,0 
3.1 
4.6 
5.5 
Source: Statistics Norway: Økonomiske analyser 6/2008 (2 December 2008), 1/2009 (19 
February), 3/2009 (27 May) and 6/2009 (1 December). Norges Bank: Monetary policy 
reports 3/08 (23 October 2008), 1/09 (19 March), 2/09 (11 June) and 3/09 (22 October). The 
dates refer to cut-off days for information, not publication dates. 
 
Neither have Norges Bank and Statistics Norway changed their views on private consumption 
in 2009 (Table 2.2). Norges Bank forecasted zero growth both in February/March and 
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October/December, while Statistics Norway increased its forecast of the real private 
consumption growth rate from -0.4 per cent in February/March to +0.2 per cent in 
October/December.  
 
The two institutions forecasts for 2010 of mainland output and private consumption growth 
rates were somewhat different in February/March 2009, but converged in the forth quarter, as 
more data was available. Statistics Norway started out as more pessimistic than Norges Bank 
in the first half of 2009, but in their last forecast in 2009, both institutions expected private 
consumption to increase solidly in 2010. 
 
Table 2.3. Forecasts of rates of unemployment and employment growth rates in Norway by 
Norges Bank and Statistics Norway in 2009 and 2010 on four different occasions in late 2008 
and in 2009.  
 
 Rate of unemployment in 
2009 (per cent of labour 
force) 
Employment growth rate 
2008-2009 (per cent) 
 Norges Bank Statistics 
Norway 
Norges Bank Statistics 
Norway 
 
October/December 2008 
February/March 2009 
May/June 2009 
October/December 2009 
 
3.25 
4.25 
3.5 
3.25 
 
 
2.7 
3.7 
3.8 
3.1 
 
-0.75 
-1.5 
-0.5 
-0.25 
 
0.1 
-0.4 
-0.8 
-0.4 
 Rate of unemployment in 
2010 (per cent) 
Employment growth rate  
2009-2010 (per cent) 
 Norges Bank Statistics 
Norway 
Norges Bank Statistics 
Norway 
 
October/December 2008 
FebruaryMarch 2009 
May/June 2009 
October/December 2009 
 
 
4.0 
4.75 
4.5 
3.75 
 
4.6 
4.7 
4.6 
3.5 
 
0 
-0.25 
-0.5 
-0.25 
 
-0.1 
-0.2 
-0.5 
-03 
Source: Statistics Norway: Økonomiske analyser 6/2008 (2 December 2008), 1/2009 (19 
February), 3/2009 (27 May) and 6/2009 (1 December). Norges Bank: Monetary policy 
reports 3/08 (23 October), 1/09 (19 March), 2/09 (11 June) and 3/09 (22 October). The dates 
refer to cut-off days for information, not publication dates. 
 
Table 2.3 shows that both Norges Bank and Statistics Norway were more pessimistic about 
the labour market in February/March than in October/December, particularly Norges Bank. 
Norges Bank’s first February/March forecasts of the rate of unemployment and employment 
growth in 2009 were 4.25 and -1.5 per cent, respectively. The revised forecasts in 
October/December were 3.25 and -0.25 per cent, respectively. This is much closer to the 
forecast by Statistics Norway.  Interestingly, while Norges Bank was more pessimistic than 
Statistics Norway about the labour market in February/March, their positions changed in 
May/June. The differences were quite small in May/June, however. 
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In regard to the two institutions forecasts for unemployment and employment growth in 2010, 
there is a clear tendency for both Norges Bank and Statistics Norway to reduce their 
unemployment forecasts, while the employment growth forecasts change very little during 
2009. 
 
Recent unemployment survey data (January 2010) indicate that both employment and the 
labour force have declined in 2009. From the third quarter of 2008 to the fourth quarter of 
2009, employment declined by 45,000 individuals (1.8 per cent of the labor force), whereas 
the labor force decreased by 36,000 (1.4 per cent), making for an increase in the rate of 
unemployment of only 0.4 percentage points.   
 
It is the young age group up to 24 years that has been hit most severely by the recession. 
During the same period, employment declined by 43,000 individuals and the labour force by 
42,000 individuals in this age group. Probably, many young Norwegians have preferred 
further education to unemployment.  
 
Growth in public sector employment has also prevented higher unemployment in Norway. 
Recent survey data suggest that employment in public administration and health services has 
increased by 19,000 individuals (0.8 per cent of the labour force) from the third quarter of 
2008 to the forth quarter of 2009.  
 
Table 2.4 looks at inflation forecasts. Norges Bank’s forecast of CPI-inflation in 2009 was 
quite high in the fourth quarter of 2008; 3 percent compared to Statistics Norway’s forecast of 
2 per cent about five weeks later. The difference diminished throughout the year. Still, there is 
a clear tendency that Norges Bank forecasts a higher rate of inflation than Statistics Norway. 
This is also true when comparing their forecast for 2010 and 2011. For example, Norges 
Bank’s forecast of inflation in 2010 in the forth quarter of 2009 was 1.75 per cent, compared 
to a forecast of only 0.8 per cent by Statistics Norway. The persistent disagreement between 
Norges Bank and Statistics Norway in regard to future inflation is surprising.  
 
 
Table 2.4 Forecasts of CPI-inflation rates in Norway by Norges Bank (NB) and Statistics 
Norway (SSB) in 2009, 2010 and 2011 on four different occasions in late 2008 and in 2009 
(per cent).  
 2009 2010 2011 
 NB SSB NB SSB NB SSB 
 
October/December 2008  
February/March 2009 
May/June 2009 
October/December 2009 
 
 
3.0 
2.0 
2.25 
2.25 
 
2.0 
1.4 
1.7 
2.1 
 
2.75 
2.0 
1.75 
1.75 
 
1.7 
1.0 
1.1 
0.8 
 
2.5 
2.25 
2.25 
2.25 
 
2.1 
2.2 
1.7 
1.7 
Source: Statistics Norway: Økonomiske analyser 6/2008 (2 December 2008), 1/2009 (19 February), 
3/2009 (27 May) and 6/2009 (1 December). Norges Bank: Monetary policy reports 3/08 (23 October), 
1/09 (19 March), 2/09 (11 June) and 3/09 (22 October). The dates refer to cut-off days for 
information, not publication dates. 
 
When looking at previous inflation forecasts for the period 2002-2008, Norges Bank has 
tended to forecast somewhat higher inflation rates 2-3 years ahead than what materialized. 
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3. Monetary policy in 2009 
 
The Norwegian economy posted high growth rates and fairly low inflation numbers in the 
period from 2003 to 2007. Then, in early 2008 Mainland growth rate slowed while inflation 
increased. In June 2008 Norges Bank raised its policy rate to 5.75 per cent, which under 
normal circumstances in financial markets would be considered as a fairly normal level. 
However, as credit spreads in money markets were unusually large, the monetary policy 
stance in 2008 clearly had a restrictive impact on growth.  
  
In October 2008, the Norwegian economy was impacted by the worldwide financial crisis as 
confidence in the interbank market collapsed (see Norges Bank Watch 2009), amplifying the 
slowdown in the Norwegian economy. Norwegian banks had been relying to an increasing 
extent on foreign sources for short-term funding. At the same time, the uncertainty sparked by 
the crisis contributed to a halt in new export orders from abroad. It became increasingly 
evident that the Norwegian economy would contract at a faster pace and to a further extent 
than most had imagined.  
 
In August 2008, manufacturing enterprises in Norges Bank’s regional network reported that 
growth would continue. But only a few months later, in November, the enterprises described 
the outlook for sales as having suffered a “heart attack”1. Developments abroad quickly fed 
through to the Norwegian economy, translating into a shortfall in funding for banks, weaker 
demand for export goods, and heightened uncertainty surrounding overall economic trends. 
The Norwegian authorities responded to the economic slowdown with strong, countercyclical 
measures. Among these, the key policy rate was reduced to 1.25 per cent in the period from 
October 2008 to June 2009 in an effort to mitigate the fallout on the Norwegian economy 
from the global crisis. 
 
 In what follows, we have evaluated monetary policy in the first half of 2009 as being part of 
the Norwegian authorities’ immediate crisis management efforts. These were followed by an 
“exit strategy” phase in which Norges Bank began to signal a return to higher rates, as it 
scaled back the crisis measures and eventually started to hike rates in October. The central 
bank’s rhetoric and actions in the period since the August interest rate meeting have been part 
of this exit strategy, in our view.  
 
 
3.1 Monetary policy in the period January – July 2009 
From a peak of 5.75 per cent in the summer of 2008, Norges Bank’s policy rate was lowered 
in stages to 1.25 per cent by June 2009, see Figure 3.1. Most other central banks cut rates to 
even lower levels. In February, March and May, the policy rate was cut by 50 basis points 
each time, whereas the last rate cut in June was 0.25 per cent. Between the release of the 
Monetary Policy Report (MPR2/09) and the final rate cut down to 1.25 per cent in June and 
the next policy meeting in August, the rhetoric coming from Norges Bank saw a marked 
change. In fact, as early as 12 August, the date of the meeting, Norges Bank hinted that it was 
getting ready to hike rates in the near future due to stronger-than-expected developments.  
 
Comparing Norges Bank’s Mainland output gap forecasts in different monetary policy reports 
(see Figure 3.2), the Bank made a considerable downward revision of the output gap path 
                                                 
1 Description from Norges Bank Governor Svein Gjedrem’s annual speech, 12 February 2009 
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between its Monetary Policy Report MPR3/08 to MPR1/09 released on 25 March. Some of 
this revision probably came already in December, when forecast for inflation and the interest 
rate were updated, but no new forecast was published for the output gap then. In MPR1/09, 
Norges Bank forecasted the turning point of the Mainland business cycle to occur in the first 
quarter of 2010, corresponding to an output gap of -2 per cent. This forecast was only 
marginally adjusted upwards in MPR2/09 (17 June), but in MPR3/09 (28 October), the 
Bank’s path for the output gap forecast was revised upwards considerably. We return to this 
issue in section 3.2 below. 
 
 
Figure 3.1. Key policy rates for Norway, US, UK, Euro and Sweden, June 2008-January 
2010. 
 
 
 
Source: Reuters EcoWin
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Norges Bank’s inflation forecasts have not changed much in 2009 (see Figure 3.3), but a 
considerable downward revision occurred in the last quarter of 2008 and from December 2008 
to March 2009 (MPR1/09). We will argue that a substantial share of the downward revision 
between MPR3/08 and the December forecast is due to methodological issues regarding how 
the CPIXE index is updated as new data is released. This is discussed further in Chapter 7. 
 
Figure 3.3 graphs Norges Bank’s forecasts for the interest rates. Evaluating the Figures 3.2-
3.4 together, it is striking how substantial the downward revisions in the policy rates are 
compared to the revisions in the output gap and inflation, in particular between MPR3/08 and 
MPR3/09. Although there are many different reasons for the recession to be so brief in 
Norway (see the discussion in Chapter 2), the figures may suggest that monetary policy was 
more powerful in this recession than expected. This will be discussed further below. 
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Figure 3.2 Norges Bank’s forecasts of the mainland output gap in the four latest monetary 
policy reports. 
 
 
 
 
Source: Norges Bank 
 
 
 
Figure 3.3 Norges Bank’s forecasts of underlying inflation (in terms of CPIXE)  in the last 
four monetary policy reports, and in December 2008. 
 
 
Source: Norges Bank 
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Figure 3.4 Norges Bank’s forecasts of the key policy rate in the four latest monetary policy 
reports and December 2008. 
 
 
 
Source: Norges Bank 
 
 
At the 4 February meeting of the Executive Board, the key policy rate was cut by 0.5 
percentage points to 2.5 percent, with the press release stating: “Global economic growth has 
weakened further since December. The international downturn seems to be having a broad 
impact and is likely to be deeper than previously expected … There is still considerable 
uncertainty surrounding developments ahead. The downturn in the Norwegian economy may 
be deeper and more prolonged than Norges Bank has assumed. Inflation may in turn become 
too low.”(our emphasize) 
 
During the press conference, Norges Bank emphasized the need for proceeding gradually with 
further interest rate cuts, a point also being made in the press release. The level of uncertainty 
was indeed very great, particularly as far as the outlook for the global economy was 
concerned. The IMF, among others, lowered its global growth forecasts for 2009 and 2010 by 
1.7 and 0.8 percentage points, respectively, compared to its November forecasts. 
 
The rate cut was widely anticipated as it had been indicated in the central bank’s interest rate 
projection from its 17 December 2008 monetary policy update.  
 
Following the aggressive rate cut in December 2008, in January the Norwegian government 
proposed changes to the 2009 budget in the form of a NOK 20 billion package of fiscal 
stimuli measures.  
 
The household sector demonstrated a very rapid recovery from the widespread anxiety seen in 
late 2008, with such indicators as consumer confidence, retail sales and house prices all on the 
rise in January. The Norges Bank’s aggressive action in cutting rates in 2008 had already 
passed through to households by early 2009 as about 90 per cent of all households hold 
floating-rate mortgages. The decision to cut rates by 0.5 per cent on 4 February, and 
indicating that further rate cuts would be forthcoming, was widely anticipated and thus caused 
little discussion among economists and other central bank watchers.  
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On 12 February, in his annual speech to the Supervisory Council of Norges Bank, Governor 
Gjedrem devoted some time to explaining why Norges Bank could not hike rates in order to 
cool down the housing market as higher rates would trigger capital inflows and a stronger 
currency:  
“Attempts to tighten monetary policy in the growth period from 2003 would, for example, 
have resulted in higher capital inflows, a noticeably stronger krone and a decline in 
manufacturing, even lower inflation, higher growth in real wages and more foreign currency 
loans to households and enterprises. The rise in credit and house prices would probably not 
have been affected to any extent and the current turnaround in the domestic economy would 
have been stronger and the fluctuations for our fragile krone even more pronounced.” 
Gjedrem also emphasised the role of the tax system in stimulating home ownership and 
pushing up house prices. He concluded that it was not the responsibility of Norges Bank to 
ensure a stable development in the housing market. It is widely acknowledged that in Norway 
housing and real estate are very advantageous investment classes compared to other asset 
classes due to the favourable tax regime and the ample supply of mortgage loans, which is 
supported by very low capital requirements on parts of the lending institutions.  
 
It appears, however, that the government’s stimuli measures to help banks with longer-term 
funding have resulted in even lower funding costs for the mortgage market, and thus may 
have contributed to the increase in house prices through 2009. Norges Bank has commented 
on this in the Monetary Policy report in June in which they state that “Norges Bank’s Survey 
of Bank Lending indicates that the swap arrangement has in turn primarily affected loan 
conditions for residential mortgages” (MPR2/09 page 25).  
On 25 March, Norges Bank released its first Monetary Policy Report for 2009 (MPR1/09) 
and cut rates by an additional 0.5 percentage points to 2 per cent. The press release stated: “It 
appears that the decline in activity in the Norwegian economy will be more pronounced than 
previously assumed. The enterprises in Norges Bank’s regional network are expecting output 
and employment to fall further over the next six months.”(our emphasize) 
 
The new report painted a much gloomier picture of the Mainland economy than the last report 
(MPR3/08), which was written before Norges Bank realized (in December 2008) how serious 
the mainland economy had been hit by international financial crisis. As noted above, the 
forecasts of the paths for the output gap and underlying inflation were lowered significantly, 
see Figure 3.2 and 3.3. 
 
The path of the key policy rate forecast was also lowered from December 2008 to March 
2009, see Figure 3.4 above. The trough of the interest rate cycle was reduced from 2 to 1 per 
cent, and expected to take place in the last quarter of 2009. The interest rate cut was widely 
anticipated, but the market had priced in further rate cuts of only about 0.5 percentage points, 
indicating policy rate would bottom out at 1.5 per cent.  
 
The fact that Norges Bank indicated further rate cuts of 1 percentage point and that policy 
rates were expected to bottom out at 1 per cent surprised the market and led to lower market 
rates and a weaker NOK. In fact, the EUR/NOK weakened from about 8.60 prior to the 
meeting on 25 March to between 8.80 and 8.90 in the days following the meeting.  
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Norges Bank made an explicit reference to its Regional Network in the assessment in the 
press release, as quoted above. It appears that Norges Bank regards information from the 
Regional Network as very useful in assessing the current state of the economy, as the 
information provided by the enterprises in the network is a more timely predictor of current 
situations than published statistics. However, the reference cited above also refers to the 
usefulness of the regional network as a leading indicator.2 As we discuss in Chapter 7, we 
found more evidence that it is a coincident indicator rather than a leading indicator. Hence the 
statement that Norges Bank’s regional network is expecting output and employment to fall 
further over the next six months, could also reflect that output was falling fast when the 
survey was conducted in February/March. 
 
On 6 May, Norges Bank cut rates by 50 basis points down to 1.5 per cent. The press release 
stated: “The global recession is having an adverse impact on the Norwegian economy and 
has resulted in a marked decline in exports. Developments since the March monetary policy 
meeting have been approximately as expected. […]There are prospects that inflation will slow 
and fall below 2.5 per cent. It is therefore appropriate to set the interest rate at a low level to 
prevent inflation from falling too far below target.” 
 
The market consensus was indeed for a rate cut of 50 basis points to 1.5 per cent in line with 
the projection from the March Monetary Policy Report (MPR1/09). Interest rates had already 
been cut to nearly zero in most other countries, as illustrated in Figure 3.1, and all indications 
pointed to low interest rate levels continuing for an extended period.  
 
 
Figure 3.5 Consumer confidence indicators, 2000 – 2009. 
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Due to the rapid transmission of rate cuts on households’ mortgage rates, the confidence in 
the household sector improved rapidly over the spring months, as illustrated in Figure 3.5. In 
particular the household’s financial situation index (dotted line in the chart) only fell in the 
                                                 
2 In Gjedrem’s speech on September 25th 2009, he states that: ”Regular interviews provide information about 
enterprises’ assessment of the economic outlook before other official statistics are available. This information is 
therefore an important part of the decision-making basis in the formulation of monetary policy.” 
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last quarter in 2008 when mortgage interest rates were at its peak, and recovered rapidly in the 
first quarter of 2009 when interest rates fell sharply. In addition, as noted in chapter 2 above, 
the unemployment rate increased far less than feared thanks partly to increased hiring in the 
public sector.  
 
It seems that the high debt level in the household sector in combination with close to 90 per 
cent floating interest rate on mortgages have made households even more responsive to 
interest rates changes than earlier. This in turn may have increased the effectiveness of 
monetary policy.  
 
On 17 June, Norges Bank cut rates by 0.25 percentage points to 1.25 per cent. In the press 
conference, Deputy Governor Jan F. Qvigstad emphasized low expected inflation as one main 
concern for Norges Bank: “It seems likely that domestic output will gradually pick up again, 
but inflation is expected to slow to around 1 ½ per cent in the coming year.” “ 
 
The interest rate path was increased slightly compared to the March report as illustrated in 
Figure 3.4 above. 
 
Although the interest rate path was lifted, it was still below market expectations, as illustrated 
in Figure 3.6. Market expectations concerning policy rates in the US, the UK and the 
eurozone had also risen measured by forward rates, reflecting increased optimism regarding 
the economic outlook abroad.  
 
 
Figure 3.6 Money market rates in the baseline scenario and estimated forward rates¹. Per cent. 
Quarterly figures, 2007 Q1 – 2012 Q4 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1) Forward rates are based on money market rates and interest rate swaps. The blue band shows the highest and lowest 
forward rates in the period 5 - 11 June 2009.  
Source: Norges Bank, MPR2/09. 
 
 
Looking at the projected paths for output gap and inflation from the March report to the June 
report, Norges Bank made no changes in the projections for 2009, and revised upward its 
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estimate for output gaps in 2010 and 2011, see figure F.2. Hence, the revisions in the output 
gaps and inflation forecasts should perhaps in normal situations indicate higher interest rates 
in 2009 due to the lags in the effects of monetary policy.  
 
Both the rate cuts in May and June were considered controversial by a number of private 
sector economists and academics, particularly the rate cut in June. Neither were these cuts 
fully priced in by the market. Indeed, by May, and certainly by June, the economy had begun 
showing signs of improvement, the government’s expansionary fiscal policy was just starting 
to have an impact, and the financial markets had improved rapidly on the back of lower 
interest rates, government guarantees and ample liquidity. Along with the strong signs that the 
economy was improving, there were growing concerns that the extraordinarily low interest 
rates could trigger a bubble in the housing market. House prices started to increase already in 
January 2009, and have continued to climb gradually back to their pre-crisis levels.  
 
The rate cut was surprising in part since according to the interest rate projection published in 
March, it was projected a reduction in the key policy rate by 0.25 percentage, with a 
probability of 50 percent for the cut being in either June or August. 
 
Could the reason for Norges Bank’s cut in June be that they was too pessimistic compared to 
other forecasters at the time? Comparing Norges Bank’s forecasts in MPR2/09 (given in June) 
to Statistics Norway’s forecasts from late May 2009, does not, however, suggest that this was 
the case. As noticed in Chapter 2 (Table 2.1), both Norges Bank, and especially Statistics 
Norway, were more pessimistic about OECD growth in May/June than later in 2009. Both 
institutions also agreed on the forecast for mainland Norway’s output for 2009, but Norges 
Bank was more optimistic about mainland growth for 2010 (a growth rate of 2.25 per cent 
compared to a 1 per cent growth rate forecast by Statistics Norway, see Table 2.2).  
 
The forecasts for private consumption are mixed. Norges Bank expected a lower growth rate 
than Statistics Norway for 2009, but a higher consumption growth rate for 2010. The forecasts 
for the labour market are similar, with Norges Bank slightly less pessimistic than Statistics 
Norway in regard to unemployment and employment growth in 2009, see Table 2.3. Hence, 
this comparison between Norges Bank and Statistics Norway does not provide arguments 
supporting a view that Norges Bank was too pessimistic in regard to output and employment 
and therefore cut the interest rate too much. 
 
When comparing the inflation forecasts of Norges Bank and Statistics Norway for 2009 – 
2011 in May/June 2009, we find that the latter forecasts have been significantly lower than 
Norges Bank’s, see Table 2.4 in Chapter 2. For all three years 2009 – 2011, Statistics 
Norway’s inflation forecasts were 0.55 or 0.65 percentage points lower than the inflation 
forecasts of Norges Bank. Therefore, if Norges Bank had adopted the inflation forecasts of 
Statistics Norway in June 2009, the Bank’s arguments for cutting the key policy rate had been 
stronger. 
 
In the press conference on June 17, Deputy Governor Qvigstad expressed concern about the 
outlook for the Norwegian krone, and the implication for export companies of a stronger 
currency. As the risk appetite had returned in financial markets, carry trades were back in 
fashion, and currencies of commodity exporting countries were beginning to become popular. 
The competitiveness of Norwegian companies was deteriorating on back of relatively high 
wage- and cost levels compared to other countries. In addition, private sector companies had 
to pay at the minimum 6-7% interest rates on loans. Should the NOK appreciate substantially, 
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this would add strain to companies in the tradable sector, as well as contributing to lower 
price growth for import in future.  
 
In its press release in the assessment on monetary policy section, Norges Bank pointed to the 
currency as a risk factor and states that: “inflation may be lower than projected if the krone 
appreciates markedly or the global downturn proves to be even deeper and more prolonged 
than expected. In this case, even stronger measures may be necessary.”  
 
 
 
NBW’s view:  
 
The committee considers Norges Banks assessment of the Norwegian economy over all 
to be well balanced in the first half of 2009. The two rate cuts in February and March 
reflected well the deterioration of the outlook of the Norwegian economy.  
  
 However, in May and June some leading indicators and the strong recovery of financial 
and asset markets suggested an earlier recovery than what Norges Bank emphasised at 
that time. The rate cut in May, and more notably in June, raised some concern in the 
private sector. However, given the unusually high uncertainty about the economic 
outlook at the time, and the exceptionally low interest rate level abroad, the committee 
does not find the rate cuts inappropriate. 
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Box 1: Liquidity policy and extraordinary measures1  
 
For monetary policy, the widening spread between money market rates and the key policy 
rate in the fall 2008 was one of the most challenging elements of the financial crisis. 
Higher and more volatile spreads added noise to the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy. Liquidity policy aims at ensuring sufficient liquidity in the banking system for the 
short-term money market rates to remain close to the key policy rate.  
 
As explained in Norges Bank Watch 2009, Norges Bank responded to the shortage of 
liquidity by supplying more and longer-term NOK-denominated funding to domestic 
banks through the F-loan facility, by easing the collateral requirements for acquiring F-
loans and by lending USD to the banks. As the banks continued to face funding 
difficulties, the government together with Norges Bank set up a facility in which banks 
could exchange Norwegian covered bonds (OMFs) for government securities for a period 
of 3-5 years, with a ceiling of NOK 350 billion. In addition, Norges Bank offered F-loans 
with a 2-year maturity to smaller banks. As it was the government who took the risk in 
connection to the swap arrangement, Norges Bank did not have to expand its balance as 
much as many other central banks.  
 
In February 2009 the Government established two new funds, the Finance Fund and the 
Bond Fund, each with a total capital of NOK 50 billion. The Finance Fund was directed to 
strengthening Norwegian banks tier 1 capital, improving their ability to uphold normal 
lending activity. The Bond Fund made it possible for industrial companies to get funding 
not only directly from banks, but also in a strengthened bond market 
 
The liquidity policy and extraordinary measures were successful and have contributed to 
normalization of the spread between the policy rate and the money market rate, as 
illustrated in the figure below. 
  
Figure 3.7 3m Nibor spread to key policy rate 
 3m NIBOR spread to key policy rate
Source: Reuters EcoWin
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1 See ”The financial crisis in Norway: Effects on financial markets and measures taken” by Tom 
Bernhardsen, Arne Kloster, Elisabeth Smith and Olav Syrstad; Gjedrem speech “Experiences with the 
financial crisis” on September 30th and Norges Banks webpage for further information. 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
3.2 Monetary policy in the period August – December 2009 
Up until its August meeting, Norges Bank had clearly pursued interest rate easing cycle. The 
August meeting represented a sharp change in rhetoric as Norges Bank indicated it would 
probably hike rates earlier than it had indicated in its June meeting. By August, the turning 
point had been moved to the third quarter of 2009, with an output gap of -1 per cent and a 
corresponding upwards adjustment of the forecasted interest rate path for 2010. This change 
in stance from June to August was to some extent anticipated by both market participants and 
economists as the rate cuts in June and to some extent in May were perceived as somewhat 
controversial and not fully priced in the market.  
 
After the August meeting, Norges Bank communicated clearly its intention to start its exit 
strategy. Norges Bank wanted to withdraw the extraordinary measures first and then hike 
rates. On October 28, Norges Bank hiked rates by 25 basis points to 1.5 per cent and signalled 
that rates would be hiked by a further 25 basis points either in December 2009 or February 
2010. Due to strong economic data, recovering financial markets, rising house prices and a 
lack of pass through from the previous policy rate hikes to mortgage and corporate rates, 
Norges Bank hiked rates in December by 25 basis points to 1.75 per cent.  
 
On 12 August, Norges Bank kept interest rates unchanged at 1.25 per cent. The press release 
stated: “It appears that output and employment in Norway may slow somewhat less sharply 
than expected. New figures may change the picture, but should these developments continue, 
it may be appropriate to increase the interest rate earlier than projected”  
 
 
Figure 3.8 Key policy rate, actual development, projection and alternative scenario with 
higher demand 
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Norges Bank pointed to the fact that the economy had developed more favourable than 
expected since the June 17th report, and indicated Norges Bank would hike rates earlier than 
what was projected in the June report. In accordance with the monetary policy meeting, 
Norges Bank only highlighted the one alternative scenario from the June report in which the 
economy recovered more rapidly than had been expected in June. The alternative scenario is 
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shown in Figure 3.8, taken from the background information in accordance with the interest 
rate meeting. The market took the information from Norges Bank as a clear signal that Norges 
Bank intended to hike rates far earlier than indicated in the June report (MPR2/09). 
 
By pointing so clearly to only one alternative scenario, Norges Bank effectively 
communicated a change of view regarding the outlook of the Norwegian economy and a need 
for higher interest rates much earlier that what they indicated in the June report.  
 
Norges Bank also made it clear that it intended to wind down the extraordinary liquidity 
measures put in place in response to the crisis before starting to hike rates. Hence, in its 
statement Norges Bank effectively pointed to all those measures that had already been 
terminated, or those that were slated for termination.  
 
NBW’s view:  
 When Norges Bank changed its view on the outlook for the Norwegian economy in 
August, this was quickly and successfully communicated to the private sector.  
 
On 23 September, Norges Bank again left interest rates unchanged at 1.25 per cent. The press 
release emphasised that aggregate demand was picking up more rapidly than expected, 
concluding that: “Higher capacity utilisation and low productivity growth may increase 
upward pressure on costs, pointing towards somewhat higher inflation and suggesting that 
the key policy rate should be raised earlier than projected in the June Monetary Policy 
Report.” 
 
Norges Bank used the phrase “The Executive Board considered the alternative of increasing 
the key policy rate at today’s meeting” as a signal that it intended to hike rates at its next 
scheduled policy meeting in October.  
 
Speaking at the Centre for Monetary Economics on 30 September, Governor Gjedrem made 
it clear that Norges Bank did in fact take house prices and credit growth into account when 
setting interest rates. In the speech, Gjedrem emphasised that house prices, the exchange rate, 
and credit growth are not target variables for Norges Bank. Still, changes in these and other 
variables would enter Norges Bank’s “reaction function”: 
 
“Norges Bank’s interest rate setting does not rely solely on one simple rule, such as the 
Taylor rule. Instead, we seek to take account of all factors that influence inflation and output 
in the medium term, and the key policy rate is set on the basis of an overall assessment. Asset 
prices such as house prices, the exchange rate and credit growth therefore have a bearing on 
Norges Bank’s interest rate setting. A written formulation of Norges Bank’s monetary policy 
reaction function would be fairly comprehensive and include all the variables that are 
considered. However, a reaction function must not be confused with the monetary policy 
target – our target function or loss function.”(our emphasize)  
 
[…] Should we seek to avert bubbles in the housing market even when medium-term inflation 
prospects are moderate? On this point, it is our judgement that a distinction must be made 
between giving greater weight to credit growth and house price inflation in the reaction 
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function and defining house price inflation as an independent monetary policy objective.” 
(our emphasize)  
Although the Governor in his speech did not say that Norges Bank is going to put more 
emphasis on house prices and credit growth in its implicit reaction function than previously,  
the governor’s remarks was interpreted by many market participants as a first indication that 
going forward Norges Bank intended to give somewhat greater weight to credit growth and 
house price inflation when deciding on interest rate changes.    
 
On 13 October, the government presented its 2010 budget, which surprised the market by 
being far more expansionary than expected. The budget involved a non-petroleum budget 
deficit of NOK 150bn, which constitute 5.7 per cent of the capital value of the Government 
Pension Fund – Global at the end of 2009 (compared to the 4 per cent rule under normal 
business cycle conditions). 
  
If the deficit remained at this level, this could potentially put a strain on monetary policy (see 
the discussion in Chapter 4). In Norges Banks Monetary Policy Report 3/2009, released on 
October 28, the central bank made a strict assumption that the nominal spending of the oil 
fund would remain at the current level in the following years in order to gradually return to 
the fiscal policy rule, as more money is expected to keep pouring into the fund. 
 
The new forecasts in MPR3/09 involved a substantial upward shift in the output gap 
projection, see Figure 3.2 above. The Bank now expected the output gap to be only –1 per 
cent at the bottom of the cycle (in the first quarter of 2010). The inflation forecast was only 
marginally adjusted and the interest rate path were lifted, see Figure 3.3 and 3.4 above. 
 
At the 28 October meeting, the Executive Board increased rates by 0.25 percentage points to 
1.5 per cent. In its press release, the Bank pointed to the fact that: “Inflation has been slightly 
higher than expected. Unemployment is considerably lower than previously projected." 
 
In addition, Norges Bank explicitly referred to rising house prices in the assessment: 
“[I]nterest rates are low, resulting in renewed growth in household consumption. At the same 
time, house prices are rising. Over time, household borrowing may surge again and saving 
may fall. With low productivity, higher corporate costs, growth in household demand and 
higher capacity utilization, inflation may gradually become too high. This would indicate that 
the interest rate should be raised.”  (our emphasize). 
 
We note that the decision in October (and later in December) to raise the policy rate 
specifically mentioned the recovery in house prices to their previous peak level being of 
relevance for the decision taken, i.e. for the increase in the interest rate hike. Going forward, 
we suspect that a number of other inflation targeting central banks will begin to highlight and 
clarify in their research, forecasts, and public statements the role that asset prices and 
quantities play in their decisions. We would strongly encourage Norges Bank to continue to 
work along these lines. 
 
When commenting on the National Budget in the press conference, Governor Gjedrem stated 
that the budget was fairly neutral with an underlying growth in expenses close to 5 percent. 
However, he warned that the risk of developing the so called “Dutch disease” was rather high 
due to the high growth in the public sector. (See Chapter 5 for a further discussion of fiscal 
policy) 
31 
 
 
As the interest rate hike was well communicated by Norges Bank, and to some extent 
anticipated by the market, this decision was not considered controversial.  
 
The Executive Board’s strategy indicated another hike by 25 basis points either in December 
2009 or in February 2010.  
 
On December 16, Norges Bank hiked interest rates by 0.25 percentage points to 1.75 per 
cent. In the press release the Bank again emphasised a sharp increase in house prices as one of 
the arguments for hiking rates.  
 
The explicit mentioning of house prices in the introduction to the press release could be 
interpreted as a signal that Norges Bank at the moment was putting more weight on the role of 
house prices in increasing private demand than earlier. This does not mean that Norges Bank 
is targeting house prices in itself, but rather that sharp movements in house prices gives 
valuable information about the outlook for aggregate demand (see Chapter 6 and 7).  
 
Norges Bank stated that “The Executive Board considered the alternative of keeping the key 
policy rate unchanged, but interest rates are low and the October increase in the key policy 
rate has had a limited impact on bank lending rates” 
 
 
 
Figure 3.9 Norges Bank policy rate and 3m NIBOR 
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Hence, the lack of pass through of the last rate hike to money market rates and lending rates to 
customers was one reason to hike rates in December rather than wait until February in order 
to ensure that the hike would be effective. Looking at the 3m NIBOR interest rate it has been 
very stable since the August interest rate meeting (see Figure 3.9). The effect of the two rate 
hikes hence have been to narrow the spread between the policy rates and the 3m NIBOR – 
and not to push up the 3m NIBOR rate. The reason is probably that the market expected and 
priced in rate hikes after the August meeting within a fairly short time horizon. Hence, the 3m 
NIBOR reflected market participants’ expectations of future interest rate hikes. As the spread 
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were more or less back to normal pre-crisis level at years’ end, it seems the spread between 
3m NIBOR and policy rates were back to a more normal level at that time, something that 
made it likely that future rate hikes will to a far larger extent be passed through to the 3m 
NIBOR and to lending rates to customers.  
 
 
NBW’s view:  
 
The October rate hike reflected well the more optimistic outlook of the Norwegian 
economy signaled by Norges Bank since August. Although the rate hike in December 
was somewhat surprising to the private sector, we believe it was appropriate to increase 
rates due to the lack of pass-through of the previous rate hike to bank lending rates and 
a more favorable outlook of the economy. We also believe it to be appropriate for 
Norges Bank to put some more weight on rapid rising asset prices. 
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4.  Credibility and transparency  
 
One important implication of having an inflation targeting Central Bank is that current 
economic behaviour to a great extent will depend on expectations about monetary policy. The 
credibility of the central bank therefore becomes extremely important. To enhance credibility, 
central banks must convince the private sector (general public, financial market and 
macroeconomic experts) that their decisions are well balanced and based on correct and 
relevant information. The disclosure of information by the central bank is therefore essential 
in reducing private sector uncertainty and increasing the predictability of future monetary 
policy actions, and final macroeconomic outcomes. However, transparency is also directly 
linked to accountability: the more transparent a central bank is, the less it can disclose its 
intentions from the private sector, to which it is accountable. Hence, transparency becomes 
important to ensure an effective monetary policy, but also that the central bank can be made 
accountable for its actions.  
 
4.1 Measuring transparency 
There is by now a voluminous literature of academic research on central bank transparency 
and communication. One part of this literature compares transparency across central banks 
and over time, see for instance Eijffinger and Geraats (2006), Dincer and Eichengreen (2007), 
Geraats (2009) and Minegishi and Cournede (2009). These studies adopt various  
transparency indices (or a variant of a particular index) developed by Eijffinger and Geraats 
(2006), covering the political, economic, procedural, policy and operational aspects of 
monetary policymaking. In the most recent evaluation, Minegishi and Cournede (2009) 
compare the transparency of 12 OECD central banks from 1998 to 2009. This study found 
that in 2009 the three most transparent central banks were Sveriges Riksbank, the Reserve 
Bank of New Zealand and the Bank of England. Norges Bank was ranked as number 4, 
together with Bank of Canada.  
 
The reasons why Norges Bank was not ranked among the world’s most transparent central 
banks were a lack of transparency of the policy objective, incomplete transparency of the 
decision making process (involving also the executive board) and lack of transparency about 
economic analysis.  
 
Regarding the issue of policy objective, many previous Norges Bank Watch groups have 
discussed the inconsistency of having the mandate refer to both inflation and exchange rate 
stabilization (see for instance NBW 2004 and NBW 2007). We will not discuss this issue 
here. As was also argued in Norges Bank Watch 2008, it is our understanding that the 
Regulation’s reference to exchange rate stability is a way of bridging the new inflation 
targeting regime with the previous exchange rate targeting regime. Norges Bank has also been 
fairly transparent on this issue, arguing that the exchange rate is an important input when 
Norges Bank constructs its forecasts for output and inflation, develops an interest rate path 
and decides on a policy strategy. However, it is not a target. Also, since the formulation of the 
mandate is the responsibility of the Ministry of Finance, there are few active steps Norges 
Bank can take to improve its transparency with regard to this issue. 
 
We will instead focus on how Norges Bank can improve its transparency with respect to the 
issue of economic analysis and the decision-making process. Before proceeding, we 
acknowledge that it is difficult to measure overall transparency by a single index in a precise 
way. Small changes in for instance the publication frequency of the forecasts can have a 
significant impact on a country’s score in the index, as emphasized for Norway by Claussen 
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(2009). However, we still believe the index can be used as a broad measure of transparency. 
All the different studies also consistently rank the Riksbank, the Reserve Bank of New 
Zealand and the Bank of England as the three most transparent central banks. 
 
4.2 Transparency of economic analyzes 
The last few years Norges Bank has approached the frontier in monetary policy transparency 
by publishing the projected interest rate path. Since the effects of a monetary policy decision 
depend on expected future decisions, the projected policy path is an integral part of the 
monetary policy stance. It provides an important tool for central banks to influence market 
expectations and thereby enhance the effectiveness of monetary policy. The projections will 
naturally be subject to a great deal of uncertainty. This is illustrated by having fan charts 
around the projections, ensuring that the projected path is not confused for a commitment.  
 
The reason why Norges Bank is loosing points in the transparency index with regard to 
economic analyses is because they do not provide forecasts on a quarterly basis. Norges 
Banks forecasts are published in the monetary policy reports that are published only three 
times a year (March, June and October). Writing a report every quarter can leave too little 
time for the staff to digest new information and conduct thorough analyses before the next 
Report has to be written. This is why Norges Bank in 2001 started publishing three Reports a 
year instead of four, see the speech by Deputy Governor Jan F. Qvigstad in November 2008.3 
Recently, the Riksbank came to the same conclusion and reduced the number of reports from 
four to three per year. However, on the three other occasions that the executive board meets in 
the course of the year, the Riksbank publishes a press release and a monetary policy update; 
the latter containing a limited number of forecasts for central macroeconomic variables. 
 
Norges Bank executive board meets eight times a year. Only on three of these occasions do 
they update the forecast, i.e. when they publish the Monetary Policy report. The exception 
was in December 2008, when the unexpected depth of the financial crisis required new 
forecast for the future policy stance. This is a good example where it is imperative to update 
macroeconomic forecasts, because they provide information about new developments 
(shocks) that affect monetary policy outcomes. Doing so will help the private sector to infer 
the central bank’s intentions from its interest rate decisions.   
 
We are sympathetic to the argument that publishing an additional monetary policy report a 
year can leave very little time for the staff to conduct thorough analyses. Good monetary 
policy decisions require in depth economic analysis. However, Norges Bank can provide 
updates of the forecasts, without having to write an additional report. Given the current 
publishing cycle of the monetary policy report (March, June and October), there is scope for 
an additional publication of forecast by the end of the year (December). The update should 
contain a limited number of forecasts for central macroeconomic variables.  
 
NBW’s view:  
 
We suggest that Norges Bank keep the number of Monetary Policy Reports to three per 
year, but consider publishing a press release and a monetary policy update at least on 
one of the other meetings; the latter containing a limited number of forecasts for central 
macroeconomic variables. As a start, Norges Bank could update the forecast for the last 
                                                 
3“Transparency and central bank communication”, Deputy Governor Jan F. Qvigstad, Speech at a seminar in 
Banca d’Italia, Rome, 4 November 2008. 
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monetary policy meeting of the year (December), thereby providing minimum four 
updates a year.  
 
 
4.3 Transparency of the decision making process 
The main reason why Norges Bank lost points on the Eijffinger-Geraats index is that the bank 
does not publish minutes and voting records. Norges Bank does, however, publish a detailed 
account explaining the Executive Board’s reasoning behind the interest rate decision. The 
statement provides an account of the main aspects of economic developments that have 
influenced the interest rate decision and the Board’s assessments. However, there is no 
indication as to how Norges Bank has weighted the different bits of information. 
 
According to a speech held by Deputy Governor Jan F. Qvigstad in November 20094, Norges 
Bank has decided not to publish minutes and to speak with only one voice. Rather than voting 
they have a “collegial”, monetary policy committee, where the members of the Executive 
Boards make unanimous decision. The ECB’s system is of the same type. The external 
members of the Governing Council of ECB are part-time members, and are employed in posts 
outside the Bank while serving as Board members.  
 
Other central banks, however, publish minutes and/or voting records. In Sweden, the central 
bank publishes the voting records and provides an extensive report with the views of members 
by name. The Bank of England publishes a similar report of the minutes, but members remain 
anonymous. In the speech by Deputy Governor Qvigstad from 2009, he points out that both 
Sveriges Riksbank and the Bank of England have committees that are referred to as 
“individualistic committees”. Each member is individually responsible for his/her vote, and 
the decision is normally decided by majority voting. Hence, the difference in practices 
between countries may partly reflect the different working of the monetary policy committees 
in the countries. 
 
What does it mean that Norges Bank has a collegial committee? Although consensus need not 
mean that all agree, it suggests the absence of strong disagreements. However, evidence from 
other central banks shows that disagreements about monetary policy decisions are actually 
very common. In particular, Geraats et al. (2008) analyzed eight central banks that publish 
their voting records and found that the rate of unanimity about monetary policy actions ranges 
from 85% to only 42%, with a median of 60%. So, if a central bank only decides to adjust the 
interest rate if there is no (strong) disagreement, it is likely to be more inertial than a central 
bank acting by a simple majority.  
 
One concern about publishing minutes is that members may come to meetings with pre-
drafted statements, impairing a constructive exchange of views. This could prevent a frank 
discussion and make monetary policymakers more reluctant to express dissenting opinions. 
While detailed meeting minutes ensure accountability among committee members, which may 
give rise to good incentives, such transparency could therefore prevent a good discussion.  
 
Minutes from Sveriges Riksbank and Bank of England, however, reveal that the analysis and 
discussion before the decisions are sophisticated and of very high quality, see Garaats (2008). 
                                                 
4 “On transparency”, Deputy Governor Jan F. Qvigstad, Speech at Det Norske Videnskaps-Akademi (The 
Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters) in Oslo, 10 November 2009. 
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However, in contrast to the current board in Norges Bank, most or all members of their 
decision making bodies are experts in monetary policy, macroeconomics or financial markets. 
Since not all members of the executive board of Norway are experts, there may be a concern 
that minutes will reveal ill-informed arguments made during the policy discussions. However, 
if such a deficiency exist, we think it would actually be useful to expose the different views, 
as it is likely to induce members to improve the quality of their discussion and thereby 
decision-making.  
 
Although Norges Bank does not release minutes, it holds a press conference after the 
monetary policy meeting. This could in principle be an adequate and even more timely 
substitute for minutes. However, the value of press conferences will depend on the ability of 
the journalist to ask appropriate questions about delicate monetary policy issues, which 
requires considerable communication skills (Geraats, 2009). Furthermore, press conferences 
will not reveal if there are different views among the members of the Executive board. 
 
One could argue that if members of the Executive board were to publish voting records, they 
would have to be individually accountable for their votes and assessments. This will place a 
workload on the external members that may not be consistent with being part-timers. 
However, the most prominent example of a central bank with external, part-time members 
that publishes non-attributed minutes and individual voting records is the Bank of England. 
Non-attributed minutes will reveal the scope and depth of the policy discussion, but will not 
identify the individual contributions of the members.  
 
Even to publish the voting patterns (without identifying individual votes) would be useful, as 
it provides an indication of the degree of disagreement and/or uncertainty among the 
members, which helps the private sector to more efficiently learn the monetary policy reaction 
function. Overall, we find the arguments supportive of having the Executive Board publish 
non-attributable minutes. 
 
As emphasized above, Norges Bank has decided to speak with only one voice. This implies 
that only internal members (the Governor and the Deputy Governor) shall relate and discuss 
monetary policy decisions in public or issues related to the operation of monetary policy. We 
suggest that also the external members should be able to discuss issues related to the operation 
of monetary policy in public. That would contribute positively to the current debates about 
monetary policymaking in Norway. Furthermore, having the right to express opinions on 
monetary policy in public will make the external members of the board benefit from 
discussing monetary policy, with the likely effect strengthening good arguments and 
weakening bad arguments.    
 
NBW’s view:  
 
We suggest that non-attributed minutes could be published, in order to strengthen the 
accountability and further improve transparency. These minutes could note without 
attribution to individual members which issues were discussed and what arguments 
were presented, as well as how (if) individual members have voted. The members should 
also be able to discuss monetary policy issues in public.  
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5. Fiscal policy: Challenges for monetary policy 
   
In the last decade, Norway’s economic growth and general macroeconomic performance have 
been strong. The current financial crisis caused only a small recession in Norway. Growth 
rates are again positive and unemployment remains below 4 percent, which is among the 
lowest level in the OECD area.  
 
The petroleum activity puts Norway in an exceptional position in relation to other countries. 
Almost 30 percent of general government revenues were generated from the petroleum 
activity (net cash flow from the petroleum sector) in 2008, compared to 5 percent in 1999. 
The increase in revenues must be seen in relation to the rapid rise in (crude) oil prices that 
went from around $10/barrel in 1998/1999 to more than $140/barrel in 2008.  
 
The government’s fiscal guidelines, introduced in 2001, stipulate that the revenues shall be 
deposited in the Government Pension Fund - Global, while the expected real return (4 
percent) on the fund can be used for public expenses. The Fund has represented a great 
opportunity for Norwegian policy makers to insure and increase general welfare in the last 
decade as well as future ones. Compared to other European governments, the Norwegian one 
has had a lot more room for fiscal maneuvering. This fiscal freedom, however, also brings 
along some pitfalls. Fiscal discipline may wear down, leading to rent seeking activities, 
excessive government spending and bureaucratization. An excessive government spending 
can in turn damage a nation's potential by causing an increase in wages and the real exchange 
rate.  
 
Next year, the guidelines for fiscal policy have been in operation for ten years. It is outside the 
scope of this report to evaluate the guidelines and their effects on the Norwegian economy. 
However, in what follows we discuss the coordination of fiscal and monetary policies, 
focusing in particular on potential challenges for monetary policy of having considerable 
room in fiscal policy in the years ahead. We wish to emphasize, that in Norway’s situation as 
a small open economy, it is particularly important that there is a commitment to credible rule 
for fiscal policy to ensure fiscal discipline. This is in line with the recommendation of 
previous Norges Bank Watch reports, see in particular NBW 2002. Below we will first briefly 
address the fiscal policy stance during the financial crisis and the consequences of having 
discretion in fiscal policy. Then we address the division of roles in economic policy, focusing 
in particular on the interaction between monetary policy and fiscal policy. 
 
5.1 Rules versus discretion in fiscal policy  
The general government’s fiscal guidelines, introduced in 2001, should ensure a predictable 
and prudent phasing-in of petroleum income into the mainland economy. Report no. 29 to the 
Storting (2000-2001), introduced the following guidelines for fiscal policy:  
 
− Petroleum revenues shall be gradually phased into the economy, in line with 
expected real return on the Government Pension Fund – Global, estimated at 4 per 
cent a year. 
 
− Fluctuations in economic activity shall be dampened in order to ensure high 
capacity utilization and low unemployment. 
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The fiscal guidelines aim at a gradual increase in the spending of oil revenues up to a 
sustainable level. Spending only the expected real return (4 percent) of the fund reflects a 
cautious attitude towards the uncertainty of the size of the total petroleum wealth as well as 
towards the risks of providing too much stimulus to the economy. Credible guidelines on 
government spending will contribute to stability by shaping expectations in the foreign 
exchange market. As the fund only invests abroad, the mainland economy is sheltered from 
the effect of huge and volatile capital flows. 
 
The last few years fiscal policy has become increasingly expansionary in Norway. At the 
outset, as wealth is gradually transformed from petroleum in the ground to financial assets, 
spending was expected to increase. However, wealth has increased by much more than the 
initial scenarios portrayed in 2001, as oil prices have more than doubled since then. 
Furthermore, in 2009 and 2010, fiscal policy also exceeded the 4 percent trajectory suggested 
by the guidelines, as seen in Figure 5.1.  
 
Figure 5.1. Expected real return on the Government Pension Fund (global) and structural non-
oil deficit.  Actual and technical projections. Billion 2009 kroner.  
 
 
Source: National budget 2010  
 
 
As can be seen from the graph, the budget deficit will increase dramatically in 2009 and 2010. 
The non-oil deficit is estimated to be NOK 45 billion above the 4 pct. trajectory in 2010, 
which corresponds to 7.8 pct. of trend GDP for mainland Norway. The figure emphasizes that 
spending of petroleum revenues is almost in line with the expected return on the Fund for 
2018, measured in constant prices. Hence, we are eight years ahead of schedule in phasing in 
the oil revenues. This can be seen by the horizontal line assuming unchanged budget deficit 
until 2018 (which is the technical assumption in the National Budget 2010). Given that the 
National Budget estimates that oil revenues peak around that time, the period with large 
annual increases in oil revenues, and hence large increase in the amount available to be spent 
over the fiscal budget may be behind us. 
 
The fiscal policy guidelines allow for the temporary use of discretionary fiscal policy for the 
purpose of stabilizing the economy. In such a situation, fiscal policy should temporarily 
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accommodate monetary policy. This year Norges Bank Watch committee finds that with the 
high level of uncertainty facing the Norwegian economy in 2008/2009, the government wisely 
allowed for an expansionary fiscal policy in 2009. However, the stimulus in the 2009 budget 
was extraordinary. According to the national budget, the 2009 stimulus is the strongest fiscal 
stimulus recorded in any years the last three decades. Fiscal policy in Norway was also very 
expansionary compared to the policies of most of our trading partners. Hence, when the 
economy showed clear signs of improvements in the summer/autumn of 2009, the 2010 
budget (released in October) should also quickly have been reversed to reflect the more 
optimistic forecasts. That would also have signaled a credible commitment to the fiscal ‘rule’.  
 
The government argues that its intention is to return to the rule in due time, but it has not 
committed to curbing the deficit back within a certain time period. However, if spending 
follows the pattern suggested in Figure 5.1, the government will by 2018 have used NOK 250 
billion more than the rule envisaged (since 2001). Hence, if the hypothetical scenario in 
Figure 5.1 becomes the present fiscal stance, monetary policy could come under severe strain.  
 
Yet, even an assumption of unchanged budget deficit could prove itself to be too optimistic. 
In the years preceding the financial crisis (2001-2008), the structural non-oil budget deficit 
grew on average by 10 percent per year (in constant prices). The lowest growth rate was 
observed in 2006, when the deficit increased with 3 percent. Furthermore, much of the 
temporary stimuli suggested in the crisis has been put on a permanent basis. This will 
maintain spending at a high level also in the years ahead. Most importantly, though, in the 
coming years, fiscal policy maneuvering will be restricted as expenditures under the National 
Insurance Scheme are expected to increase by a total of NOK 25 billion for the three-year 
period 2011-2013, corresponding to NOK 8 billion per year (according to the National Budget 
2010). This is higher than what has been recorded in the most recent years. Both a growing 
number of old-age pensioners, longer life and higher pension entitlements than former 
beneficiaries contribute to this sharp growth in expenditure. 
 
The estimates of future petroleum reserves and energy prices are uncertain, making it difficult 
to project the recommended 4 percent spending trajectory. For instance, the government’s oil 
revenues, which are allocated to the Fund, have been lower than expected the last year owing 
to, among other things, lower oil prices than expected. If oil prices increase by more than 
anticipated in the years ahead, thereby increasing the Fund and the 4 pct. trajectory, spending 
can also increase. However, prices could well fall again, and natural gas prices have so far 
been much lower that the projection from the National Budget.  
 
Hence, given how far spending is above the 4 percent trajectory and what we now know about 
future entitlements, it is  important that the government now commits to returning to the 4 
percent trajectory within a given time period. That is necessary to have a credible 
commitment to the fiscal rule. 
 
There are many well-known problems associated with a discretionary use of fiscal policy for 
stabilizing the business cycle. First, there are implementations lags that make fiscal-policy 
stimuli arriving too late. These lags include time to collect data, time to identify the phase of 
the business cycle, time in formulating the appropriate fiscal-policy response, and time to 
implement expenditure alterations or tax changes. As a result, it is quite common that fiscal 
stimulus arrives too late, the impulse in inappropriate, and that policy may become 
destabilizing and even procyclical. 
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Second, focusing on short-term stabilization goals may reduce the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy in attaining long-term goals. On a general note, it is politically much easier to obtain 
consensus for cutting taxes and increasing spending in business cycle downturns than to agree 
on spending cuts and tax hikes in booms. There is therefore an expansionary bias in 
discretionary fiscal policy, leading to a higher real interest rate, a stronger currency and lower 
aggregate saving and investment. 
 
Finally, excessive discretionary government spending can damage a nation's production 
levels by causing an increase in wages and the real exchange rate. This makes tradeable 
sectors less competitive in world markets, so that the sector declines. This phenomenon has 
been referred to as a Dutch Disease in the literature, describing the decline of the 
manufacturing sector in the Netherlands in the 1970s, a decade after they first discovered 
large natural gas fields. 
 
A strong growth in public expenses has raised the concern that Norway will suffer from Dutch 
Disease. The first symptoms are indeed visible. Labor cost has increased steadily the last 
decade, leading to a decline in competitiveness for the manufacturing sector. Norges Bank’s 
governor has also addressed this issue recently. On the press conference 28 October 2009 he 
argued that the risk of a Dutch Disease in Norway is large.  
 
The remedy for defeating the disease in the Netherlands was to reduce government spending. 
When asked if this is a recommended cure also for Norway, the Governor relied “I don’t know 
about any other [remedies].” The Governor also emphasized that less government spending 
than currently announced in the National Budget, would lead to a lower interest rate, a less 
appreciated currency and thereby a more competitive tradeable sector. This has also been 
emphasized in various Monetary Policy Reports.  
 
NBW view:  
 
Norway’s situation as a small open economy makes it particularly important that there 
is a commitment to a credible rule for fiscal policy. Without such commitment, the 
Norwegian economy may encounter periods of decline and instability. This may put 
upward pressure on the interest rates and on the exchange rate, leading to deterioration 
of industries exposed to international competition.  
 
5.2 The division of roles in economic policy - Fiscal and monetary policy 
Policy-coordination failure is potentially serious problem with discretionary fiscal policy. In 
particular, the government and the central bank could have different opinions about the 
current state of the economy, calling for different policy responses. Suppose, for example, that 
the central bank believes that there is excess demand so that the current output gap is positive, 
while the government believes that the output gap is zero (or negative). If fiscal policy aims at 
short-run stabilization, a coordination problem could arise. If the central bank tightens 
monetary policy in order to prevent increasing inflation, the government could think that 
fiscal loosening is appropriate. But then the central bank could react to undo the effects of the 
fiscal policy, and so on. This process would lead to a very unfortunate policy mix: Too 
expansionary fiscal policy and a very tight monetary policy (see Leitemo, 2004). 
 
In the present financial crisis, many countries that previously had scaled back discretionary 
fiscal policy, have again increased spending dramatically. However, in many countries, 
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automatic stabilizers (like unemployment benefits and income transfers) are built into today’s 
welfare states. For Norway, the stabilizing effects of the automatic stabilizers are substantial 
(OECD ranges Sweden and Norway on top). Such automatic stabilizing effects present little 
problems for monetary policy as they are predictable and can be taken into account when 
monetary policy is formulated. In many cases strong automatic stabilizing effects also reduce 
the need for large interest rate changes that otherwise would have had to be applied.   
 
In general, good coordination of monetary and fiscal policy can be achieved by placing each 
within a decision framework, having both focusing on medium-term objectives and making 
those objectives and related actions transparent and predictable see Norges Bank Watch 2002. 
In this way, fiscal actions can take full account of the likely monetary-policy response, and 
vice versa (Leitemo, 2004). Regular information exchange between fiscal and monetary 
authorities will improve matters. 
 
Norges Bank has been very clear and transparent about the division of roles in economic 
policy, in particular regarding the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy stance. The 
following citation from a speech held by Svein Gjedrem in 2002 illustrates this point:5 
 
“A precondition for effective interaction is that decision-making bodies recognise how 
their decisions will affect decisions of the other body. In the absence of such 
recognition, a decision will not produce the intended result. The economy may move in 
a highly unfavourable direction, with high interest rates, sluggish economic growth 
and a deterioration in the state's financial position. A situation may, for example, arise 
in which Norges Bank tightens monetary policy to achieve the inflation target, while at 
the same time the central government authorities increase the use of petroleum 
revenues (more than implied in the fiscal policy guideline) in order to increase 
employment and reduce unemployment.” 
 
This statement is even more relevant today. At the interest rate meeting on 28 October 2009, 
Norges Bank announced its first of many interest rate hikes after the expansionary period 
2008/2009 (see chapter 3).  In so doing, they emphasized the following in the press release: 
“Inflation has been slightly higher than expected. Unemployment is considerably lower than 
previously projected.” Just two weeks prior to this meeting, the government presented its 
2010 budget, which surprised the market by being far more expansionary than expected. 
Where Norges Bank had signaled a recovery for the Norwegian economy, the government 
emphasized instead low growth rates (the National Budget 2010: A summary, p 5): “Given the 
decline in activity in 2009 and below-trend growth in 2010, unemployment is expected to rise 
somewhat in the near term. On this background, the Government has chosen to base the 2010 
Budget on a slight additional increase in the spending of oil revenues.“ 
 
In the annual address the Governor gave on 11 February 2010, he argued again for the 
importance of a recognizing the interaction between fiscal and monetary policy stance in 
stabilizing the business cycles. In what was named a “handbook” of effective Keynesian use 
of instruments, Norges Bank suggested the following division based on historical experience: 
 
 
                                                 
5 Cited from “Lecture by Svein Gjedrem, Governor of Norges Bank at the Norwegian School of Economics and 
Business Administration”, Bergen, 17 October 2002. Available on the web: http://www.norges-
bank.no/templates/article____17882.aspx 
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“First, when demand for goods and services and inflation prospects fall, the interest 
rate is lowered. At the same time, the automatic stabilisers in the budgets will work 
when tax revenues fall and benefit payments increase.  
 
When the fall in demand for goods and services is so steep that an interest rate close 
to zero is not sufficient, tax rates are reduced or government measures are applied. 
The measures should not influence long-term public sector priorities such as the size 
of the welfare state or the permanent tax level.  
 
When the economy turns, as it now has in Norway, the rule is that fiscal policy should 
be tightened fairly rapidly. This provides room for growth in the business sector. 
When public expenditure has been reduced, the key rate can then be increased to a 
normal level.” 
 
 
Clearly, the Norges Bank’s “handbook” of effective Keynesian use of instruments stresses the 
use of rules/guidelines in fiscal policy. When growth prospects almost collapsed in the 
autumn of 2008, a discretionary expansionary fiscal policy was called for. That was consistent 
with the guidelines for fiscal policy in Norway. However, by not reversing the fiscal measures 
when growth prospects improved the year after, we find that fiscal policy has become too 
expansionary. If fiscal policy stay on its current track, we are concerned it may create tensions 
in the monetary policymaking in Norway, as Norges Bank will have to hike rates to counter 
the expansionary effect, hence contributing to a stronger currency and smaller tradeable than 
if the fiscal-policy rule had been adhered to.  
 
 
NBW view:  
 
Norges Bank has been clear in arguing that a precondition for effective interaction 
between monetary and fiscal policy is that decision-making bodies recognize how their 
decisions will affect each other. In the absence of such recognition, discretionary fiscal 
policy can create tensions in the monetary policymaking in Norway. If fiscal policy stays 
on its current track, we are concerned it would represent a considerable challenge to 
Norges Bank. 
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6. Asset prices and monetary policy: Implications for Norway 
 
By Richard Clarida 
 
6.1. Introduction and overview 
As the world economy appears to be emerging from the worst financial crisis and deepest, 
most synchronized global slump in 75 years, policymakers, regulators, and academics are 
focusing intensely and appropriately on ‘lesson to be learned’, with particular attention paid to 
defining and calibrating the extent to and means by which movements in asset prices should 
influence the conduct of monetary policy.   In the years leading up to the crisis, there had 
developed a broad consensus among monetary policy makers in inflation targeting countries 
on the role that asset prices should play in an inflation targeting strategy.   An excellent 
summary of this consensus is provided by Lars Svensson, Deputy Governor of the Riksbank 
and, as a former Professor of Economics at Princeton, a leading academic expert on inflation 
targeting. 
 
“Asset prices will affect policy to the extent they are deemed to affect the forecasts of 
the central bank's target variables that is, inflation and resource utilization.  Suppose, 
however, that a large asset-price increase is deemed to be fragile and a possible 
bubble, with a significant risk for a future collapse. Suppose further that a future 
collapse is deemed to have undesirable consequences for future inflation and resource 
utilization. Then the bank faces a delicate situation. It is possible that a policy-rate 
path with a higher policy-rate in the near future will be deemed to dampen asset-price 
increases in the near future and also reduce the risk or size of a collapse in the more 
distant future, thus undershooting the inflation target in the near term but providing a 
more stable development of inflation and resource utilization in the medium and 
longer term. These are examples of situations when the central bank may choose to 
respond to asset-price developments. However, the reason for these responses is that 
the central bank is concerned with the repercussions for inflation and resource 
utilization, not with the asset prices as such. That is, asset prices are not target 
variables; they do not enter the loss function.  There is no scope for any mechanical 
adjustment of asset prices or bubbles. The central bank's reaction will not be stable 
but shift with its judgment… It is [not] productive to discuss these issues directly in 
terms of the central bank's reaction function, for instance as modifications of a Taylor 
rule (Svensson (2009), p. 10) 
 
It is important to understand the point that an inflation forecast targeting central bank 
following the approach outlined by Svensson may well find it optimal to lean against swings 
in asset prices, but only to the extent these swings influence the forecast of inflation or 
possibly, the output gap. A simple example that extends Clarida (2001) is provided in the 
appendix. There we show that to the extent that rising asset prices put upward pressure on the 
expected output gap and expected inflation a central bank following a forward looking Taylor 
rule will lean again such asset price moves by raising the policy rate even if the asset price 
itself does not enter the objective function  
 
So given this consensus, which appears to have broadly guided Norges Bank policy since the 
adoption of inflation targeting in 2001, what lessons have some taken from the crisis that 
would argue to modify inflation targeting  policy going forward?  Experts at the  BIS had for 
some years leading up to the crisis offered critiques of the inflation targeting consensus and 
since the crisis, have called for major changes in that consensus.  According to this critique, 
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the inflation targeting monetary policy pursued by many central banks suffered from several 
defects. The focus on inflation and output stabilization resulted in a path for interest rates that 
did not sufficiently reflect the dangers that arise when an asset price boom is coupled with a 
credit boom. The focus on price stability, combined with the fact that many central banks had 
limited or no supervisory role meant, according to this view that they ignored or failed to 
incorporate into their rate setting decisions the very real, systemic threats arising from credit 
and asset price booms that had been building during the ‘Great Moderation’.  Finally, 
confining monetary policy to setting a path for the short term interest rate in retrospect proved 
insufficient in many countries to cushion booms and busts in real economic activity and 
inflation resulting from excesses in financial markets.  According to this emerging view, it is 
not clear that any feasible path for the policy rate would have sufficed and thus, a that set of 
regulatory macroprudential instruments will, going forward, be required to complement the 
traditional instrument of policy of setting a path for the short term interest rate.  As the BIS 
points out in its most recent Annual Report   
 
“It is not surprising that government officials and market participants were 
largely deaf to the alarms. A common response was: “Even if you are right, 
and the financial system is in danger, what do you want me to do?” Monetary 
policymakers’ only available instrument was the short-term interest rate, and 
there was a broad consensus that this tool would be ineffective against the 
alleged threat. At the macroeconomic level, the expectation was that price 
stability would be enough and that asset and credit booms would self-correct. 
And at the microeconomic level, officials believed that investors’ self-interest 
would lead them to pay attention to the risks inherent in what they purchased 
and act as their own regulators. The narrow focus on regulated institutions, 
combined with a belief in the efficacy of self-regulation, meant that officials 
were insufficiently alert to system-wide threats. And across countries, 
markedly differing views about what could and should be done sharply limited 
progress on what turned out to be an international problem. Discussions of the 
need for someone to monitor and address the risk in the financial system as a 
whole mostly fell flat. Numerous central banks took their financial stability 
objectives seriously…. [but]   in the industrial economies – especially the 
United States, where the problem was becoming the most severe – there was 
little discussion of what types of tools policymakers might try to use to combat 
the property and credit booms, and the consequent build-up of systemic risk. 
And it is easy to see why. Making what would have been wholesale changes to 
the monetary and regulatory policy frameworks in many countries would have 
presented nearly insurmountable political and intellectual difficulties. Why 
would anyone risk such a move when the existing apparatus appeared to be 
working so well? (BIS Annual Report 2009, pp. 11-12).” 
 
With this background, we review the path of asset prices and quantities in Norway in the 
years leading up to the crisis.  We then examine the stance of monetary policy in Norway as 
these asset price and leverage developments occurred. We conclude that, even in retrospect 
knowing what we know now and knowing much more about subsequent developments than 
did Norges Bank at the time, that the stance of Norges Bank policy consistent with flexible 
inflation targeting was also broadly appropriate during the last rate hike cycle, and as 
emphasized in Section 3, the announced path of policy normalization commencing with the 
rates hikes in the fall of 2009, appear to be appropriate and well communicated.    
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6.2. Asset prices and quantities as indicator variables: Lessons for Norges 
Bank 
The above discussion highlighted the role that asset prices and quantities could play in 
guiding an inflation targeting monetary policy even for a central bank, such as the Norges 
Bank, that did not target these prices and quantities by including them in the objective 
function.  Recent research by the IMF sheds light on the information role that asset prices and 
quantities have provided in previous housing and stock market busts in major economies since 
1970.  The message is relevant for any central bank, including Norges Bank, that monitors 
asset prices and quantities as information variables.  In this section we will focus on episodes 
of house price busts, but the IMF findings are similar for equity price declines.  
 
 
Figure 6.1 Select Indicators Before Major House Price Busts   
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Quarterly observations on asset prices and macroeconomic variables for 21 advanced economies from 1970 to 2008. Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom, and United States. 
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This research by the IMF has some important implications for central banks such as Norway’s 
that monitor asset prices as indicator variables. The study confirms the valuable information 
content contained in data on credit flows, economic activity in the construction sector, and 
current account imbalances. However, at the same time IMF also pointed out that while this 
information has value, the ability to predict house price busts over a three year window – even 
with the benefit of hindsight afforded in the selection of variables and thresholds – can be 
difficult. Even when combining multiple signals and using thresholds to attempt to improve 
the ratio of signal to noise, at most only half the time in the IMF panel do the best indicator 
variables actually correctly signal an asset price bust within one to three years. If inflation is 
well anchored, policymakers will in practice have to think carefully about an aggressive hike 
in interest rates solely to prevent an asset price bubble from forming given just 50-50 chance 
that the signal of a bubble is correct.  Advocates of including asset prices in the objective 
function of the central bank often appear to downplay this fact, implicitly assuming much 
higher likelihood of successfully identifying the bubble than appears to be possible at a 
horizon of one to three years. 
 
For sake of comparison, we review the behavior of credit growth, resident construction, and 
the current account in Norway before an after the peak in housing prices that occurred in the 
fourth quarter of 2007. 
 
 
 
Figure 6.2: House Prices in Norway versus US 
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Figure 6.3 Norway Residential Construction versus Real GDP 
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Figure 6.4 Norway Residential Construction/GDP Deviation from 8 Year Moving 
Average 
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Figure 6.5  Norway Household Debt Outstanding versus Nominal GDP 
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Average 
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Figure 6.7. Norway Current Account Deviation from 8 Year Moving Average 
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As Figure 6.1 makes clear, there appears to be useful information in at least several of these 
indicators that could be help to predict house price busts (defined as a four quarter decline in 
house prices of at least 5 percent).  Note that all of the variables displayed are deviations from 
rolling eight year moving averages in the growth rate or, where appropriate, GDP shares of 
these variables.  Focusing on the crises since 1985, we see that rapid credit growth, residential 
investment, and a deteriorating current account balance (relative to the eight year rolling 
moving average) appear, on average to precede house price busts. 
 
 
We note that these three best indicators of  an unsustainable rise in house prices were 
providing conflicting signals for Norway in the quarters leading up to the peak in house 
prices.  Residential construction relative to GDP was indeed rising very rapidly compared 
with its 8 years moving average and well above the level in the IMF panel which pre – dated 
housing busts in other countries.  Turning to household debt accumulation, we see that while 
household leverage in Norway was increasing in the past decade, this followed a sustained 
period in the 1990s when the household sector was de leveraging after the Scandinavian 
financial crises of the early 1990s.  Compared with the other episodes,  increases in household 
leverage on a quarter to quarter basis in Norway were not far from the pace recorded in the 
IMF panel and , but on an 8 years average basis, mostly above.  It should be noted, however, 
that Norway benefited from a significant terms of trade/wealth effect from the rise in oil 
prices during the past decade, and the measures of GDP used in the above charts include this 
effect.  Relative to mainland GDP, leverage and residential investment were growing even 
more rapidly during the boom. Although it is difficult to quantify precisely, it would seem that 
some increase in household leverage would be expected and appropriate given the 
deleveraging and terms of trade decline experienced during the 1990s.  Thus the challenge for 
Norges Bank was and will be going forward calibrating a signal of excessive household 
leverage in periods of improved or improving terms of trade. Turning to the third signal we 
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see that the deviation of the Norway’s current account balance from its 8 year average,  while 
declining, were positive in the quarters leading up to the peak in house prices.  This of course 
reflected the rise in oil prices/improved terms of trade that occurred during this period. 
 
As for Norges Bank policy, during the years before the peak in house prices, Norges Bank 
was of course raising the policy rate, and rather aggressively so given the path for policy set 
by the ECB.  This policy, along with the rise in oil prices, contributed to an appreciation of 
the exchange rate. 
 
 In summary, it would seem that Norges Bank has been well served by incorporating 
information on leverage, asset prices, and international capital flows as indicator variables as 
it has implemented flexible inflation targeting.  We note that the decision in November 2009 
to raise the policy rate specifically mentioned the recovery in house prices to their previous 
peak level as one factor that contributed to the decision.  We did not take this message in 
suggest that house prices or other asset prices are now in the objective function of the Norges 
Bank, and did not find it confusing.  In fact, we suspect that going forward, a number of other 
inflation targeting central banks will begin to highlight and clarify in their research, forecasts, 
and public statements the role that asset prices and quantities play in their decisions and we 
would strongly encourage Norges Bank to continue along these lines. 
 
 
Figure 6.8 Change in Household Leverage versus Spread Between Norges and ECB Policy 
Rate   
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As can be seen from the chart, while a range of factors and information variables have 
informed Norges Bank policy in recent years, the net result was a substantial tightening of 
policy, both in absolute basis points as well as relative to the ECB, at the same time as 
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household leverage was returning and surpassing previous peaks, residential investment was 
booming, and house prices were rising. To this group, it would seem that policy in the last 
several years of the housing boom, in retrospect, has reflected some of the information 
available and uncertainties facing the Norges Bank at that time.  
 
 
6.3. Macro Prudential Responsibility 
In the wake of the global financial crisis, there has developed something of a consensus that 
many if not most countries should in future empower existing or perhaps new institutions with 
an explicit “macro prudential” function which will seek to monitor, supervise, and regulate 
systemically important financial intuitions taking into account the macro risk to the financial 
system they and other such initiations impose.  A clear statement of this view is provided by 
the Squam Lake Group of distinguished US academics and former policymakers . 
  
Financial regulations in almost all countries are designed to ensure the 
soundness of individual institutions, principally commercial banks, against the 
risk of loss on their assets. This focus on individual firms ignores critical 
interactions between institutions. Attempts by individual banks to remain 
solvent in a crisis, for example, can undermine the stability of the system as a 
whole.  …. Similarly, the failure of one financial institution can inflict severe 
losses that threaten the viability of many others.  The focus on individual 
institutions can also cause regulators to overlook important changes in the 
overall financial system. For example, although the markets for securitized 
assets  ….. grew dramatically in the years before the current crisis, the existing 
regulatory structures [in many countries] did not evolve with them…  
 
One regulatory organization in each country should be responsible for overseeing the 
health and stability of the overall financial system. The role of the systemic regulator 
should include i) gathering, analyzing, and reporting information about 
significant interactions between and risks among financial institutions; ii) 
designing and implementing systemically sensitive regulations, including 
capital requirements; and iii) coordinating with the fiscal authorities and other 
government agencies in managing systemic crises. We argue …. that the 
central bank should be charged with this important new responsibility. (Squam 
Lake Working Group, May 2009, p. 2)  
 
Each country, including Norway, will have to assess how best to design and implement 
systemic regulatory authority in the wake of the financial crisis. The Ministry of Finance is 
responsible for overall financial stability and the regulatory framework. Supervision on 
Financial stability is shared between the Ministry of Finance, Finanstilsynet and Norges Bank. 
The statutory basis for Norges Bank’s responsibility for financial stability is laid down in the 
Norges Bank Act. However, the Act does not directly specify or define the mandate. The 
primary basis for Norges Bank’s responsibility for financial stability is indirectly mentioned 
in Sections 1 and 3 of the Act. Section 1 states that Norges Bank shall promote an efficient 
payment system domestically as well as vis-à-vis other countries, and that the Bank shall 
monitor developments in the money, credit and foreign exchange markets. Section 3 states 
that Norges Bank shall inform the Ministry of Finance when, in the opinion of the Bank, there 
is a need for measures to be taken by others than the Bank in the field of money, credit and 
foreign exchange policy. Norges Bank publishes its assessment of the outlook for financial 
stability in semi-annual reports. Norges Bank, Finanstilsynet and the Ministry of Finance 
meet regulary in so-called "tripartite meetings" to exchange information and discuss the status 
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of the financial system. Norges Bank  has no supervision or regulatory responsibilities for 
financial institutions in general. The supervision of individual financial institutions is 
Finanstilsynet’s responsibility. Finanstilsynet is also administering the general legislation 
applying to such institutions and has a role as a macro prudential financial regulator.  
However, Norges Bank is responsible for the monitoring and supervision of the interbank 
payment systems. Norges Bank’s responsibility for the overseeing of the interbank systems is 
laid down in Section 1 of the Norges Bank Act, which states that Norges Bank shall promote 
an efficient payment system domestically as well as vis-à-vis other countries. The Payment 
System Act assign Norges Bank responsibility for the authorization and supervision of 
Norwegian interbank systems.  
 
The committee believes that Norges Bank should continue and enhance its responsibility for 
analyzing, reporting, and communicating macro prudential information about significant 
interactions between and risks among financial institutions, as part of its  Financial Stability 
Report. By having regular meetings with Finanstilsynet and the Ministry of Finance, it will 
enhance and contribute to the macro prudential supervision. To the extent that monitoring and 
analyzing compliance with macro prudential requirements requires the gathering of  
information not currently collected by existing authorities, Norges would  also need to be 
responsible for making sure it has the data it needs for the task.  The committee does not 
believe it  should be necessary for Norges Bank to assume responsibility for collecting 
financial data  that is currently being collected by  other agencies.  Moreover, it should in 
many cases be possible to separate the responsibilities for ascertaining  which new data needs 
to be collected  by the responsibility for collecting and aggregating such data. 
 
It is the third role envisioned for the systemic risk regulator – that of ‘coordinating’ the 
management of future financial crises – where Norges Bank and other central banks need to 
tread carefully. Resolution of financial crises often requires the commitment fiscal resources, 
sovereign borrowing authority, and  loan guarantees of significant size and for extended 
periods of time. While it is difficult to imagine a serious financial crisis in which the expertise 
of the central bank would not be called upon and essential to their successful resolution, this 
does not, to the committee, imply that the central bank must necessarily direct  or  
‘coordinate’ such efforts, whatever that might mean.  Indeed, there are sound reasons for 
independent central banks not  to or to be perceived as directing or dictating fiscal  policy 
intervention in financial crises that require the commitment of government revenue , 
sovereign borrowing authority, and  loan guarantees of significant size and for extended 
periods of time.   Bagehot’s dictate for central banks in crisis to lend against ‘good collateral 
at a penalty’ rate  may not always and everywhere apply in times of crisis, but obliterating the 
line between monetary and fiscal authority as a matter of course and design in any new  
macro prudential regime  would seem to run the serious risk  of  materially compromising  
central bank independence and the ability achieve price stability as a matter of course.  
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APPENDIX 
 
It is important to understand the point that inflation forecast targeting central bank following 
the approach outlined by Svensson (may well find it optimal to lean against swings in asset 
prices, but only to the extent these swings influence the forecast of inflation or possible, the 
output gap.   To illustrate some key points, it will be useful to consider a simple example that 
extends Clarida (2001).  Let zt = [πt  ,yt,  rt , ht ]  with yt the output gap,   πt inflation, rt the 
policy rate, and ht an asset price.  Suppose the central bank uses a VAR to forecast the 
economy. 
 
zt = Dzt-1 + u 
 
Now, a simple forward looking Taylor rule model can be written as 
 
r t = β E[πt+n | zt-1] + γE[yt+n | zt-1] +  νt 
 
where it will be noted that the asset price ht does not directly enter the Taylor rule. For 
simplicity assume a simple Phillips curve relationship 
 
πt+n = b  y t+n  + o t+n 
 
where o t+n is a supply shock and  Eπt+n = b E y t+n  . 
 
Using the VAR 
  
E[π t+n | zt-1] = 1Dn zt-1 
 
and using the structural Philips curve relationship 
 
E[y t+n | zt-1] = b1Dn zt-1 
 
where 1 is the vector [1, 0 ,0 ,0].  Substituting back into the forward looking Taylor rule, we 
can write a reduced form Taylor rule which is the interest rate equation in the VAR model. 
 
rt = (β + bγ) Dn11πt-1 + (β + bγ)Dn12 yt-1  + (β + bγ) Dn13rt-1 + (β + bγ) Dn14ht-1 + v t 
 
The scalar  Dn14  is the regression coefficient of the lagged asset price in forecasting inflation 
n periods in the future while bDn14 is the regression coefficient in forecasting the future output 
gap based on the lagged asset price.  Thus to the extent that rising asset prices put upward 
pressure on the expected output gap and expected inflation a central bank following a forward 
looking Taylor rule will lean again such asset price moves by raising the policy rate even if 
the asset price itself does not enter the objective function  
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7. The forecasting process – models and judgements 
 
Policymaking entails evaluating the future trajectory of the economy, and making policy 
decisions to influence that trajectory in favorable directions. Hence, policy decisions rests 
critically on the quality of the macroeconomic forecasting.  
 
Since November 2005, all macroeconomic forecasts from Norges Bank have been based on 
their own predictions regarding expected future interest rate setting. This forecasting analysis 
makes use of a structural model called NEMO (see Brubakk et al. 2006), but the model is 
primarily suited for medium term analysis of the effects of monetary policy on the 
macroeconomy. Norges Bank’s forecasts for the first few quarters are largely based on current 
statistics, information from Norges Bank’s regional network and forecasts obtained from a 
number of short-term statistical and econometric models. The published projections in the 
monetary policy reports are the result of an overall assessment based on both models and 
judgment. 
 
Norges Bank’s forecasting process can briefly be described as follows:  
 
• Short term forecast are given for 3-4 quarters. Conditional on these forecasts, NEMO 
is used to compute forecasts for up to a 2-3 year horizon. 
 
• Through an iterative process, a time path for the key policy rate is derived so that the 
predicted underlying inflation rate approaches the target level of 2.5 per cent and the 
output gap approaches zero in the medium term.  
 
In the last few years, Norges Bank has developed surveys, econometric models and structural 
macroeconomic model(s) that have been adopted in the Bank’s forecasting process. This 
analytical work is impressive, drawing on high level skills in diverse areas such as economic 
theory, statistics, econometrics, mathematics and programming techniques. However, 
developing models to describe and forecast the behaviour of the Norwegian economy is also 
subject to many important judgmental decisions that can have a material impact on the 
forecasts of the models. These decisions include the choice of the data set, the transformations 
applied to the data, the dynamic specification of the model, the choice of estimation 
techniques and so on. Put simply, a theoretical model may be mathematically sophisticated, 
but if mis-specified, will fail to capture empirical regularities of economy activity which are 
important for monetary policy. In the following we will describe and evaluate the main 
ingredients in Norges Bank’s forecasting process; models and judgment. Our discussion will 
deal with the following topics (1) The use of indicators in monetary policy - Measures of 
underlying inflation, (2) Analysis of the current situation (surveys), (3) Analysis of the short 
term (forecasting models), (4) Analysis of the medium and long term (NEMO), (5) 
Incorporating financial frictions into the models and finally, (6) Incorporating oil prices into 
the models. 
 
7.1. Indicators in monetary policy - Measures of underlying inflation  
At the centre of inflation targeting lies two widely used concepts; underlying inflation and the 
output gap. Although these concepts are generally understood and widely used by the 
economic profession, there are no unique instrumental definitions of either of these concepts, 
and therefore no single, universally agreed method of measuring them. Nevertheless, as they 
remain the central targets in a monetary objective function, they should be critically evaluated 
by Norges Bank. 
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Many previous Norges Bank Watch reports have discussed and assessed these concepts in 
detail. In our discussion, we have chosen only to focus on underlying inflation. We refer to 
Norges Bank Watch 2004 and 2008 for evaluations of the usefulness of the output gap 
concept for monetary policy analysis. Although several measures of underlying inflation are 
regularly assessed by Norges Bank,6 we would suggest further evaluation both regarding 
definition and methods and how to measure underlying inflation.  
  
Consumer price inflation varies from month to month, sometimes substantially due to 
extraordinary fluctuations in certain product markets or changes in taxes and subsidies. 
Norges Bank’s 2001 mandate (Royal Decree of 29 March) therefore opens up for ignoring 
extraordinary consumer price disturbances when setting the interest rate (also referred to as 
escape clauses): 
 
“In general, the direct effects on consumer prices resulting from changes in interest rates, 
taxes, excise duties and extraordinary temporary disturbances shall not be taken into 
account.” 
 
In interpreting its monetary policy mandate, Norges Bank has argued that it will focus on 
developments in a particular measure of underlying inflation ( CPI-ATE inflation) when 
setting the interest rate. This index is calculated from CPI  but adjusted for tax changes and 
excluding energy products. In their own wording, (Inflation Report 2/01, pp. 8-9): 7 
 
“Norges Bank will focus on developments in the [CPI-ATE] when it assesses monetary policy 
performance in its annual report.” 8 
 
Since October 2001, Statistics Norway has published CPI-ATE regularly as a supplement to 
the CPI.  
 
A measure of underlying inflation can influence policymaking since Norges Bank pay close 
attention to CPI-ATE in its operation of monetary policy. In practice, this means that Norges 
Bank will construct forecast of CPI-ATE (with fan charts) conditioning on the interest rate 
path. In this way, Norges Bank will seek to stabilize CPI-ATE (around the inflation target).  
 
CPI-ATE is not, however Norges Bank’s only measure of underlying inflation. Following 
among other a suggestion by Norges Bank Watch 2004, Norges Bank has regularly assessed a 
series of alternative indicators.9 These are displayed together with CPI-ATE in a separate 
                                                 
6 See for instance Simensen and Wulfsberg (2009) for an interesting indictor of underlying inflation that gives 
less weight to prices that change frequently than to those that change infrequently. Such an indicator was also 
suggested by Norges Bank Watch 2007. 
7 The same is also specified in Norges Bank’s Occasional Papers nr. 34 from 2004 (page 91).  
 
8 In the Inflation report 2/01 Norges Bank denoted the measure CPIXE, but since Statistics Norway started 
publishing the series, it has been referred to as CPI-ATE. 
9 Norges Bank Watch 2004 pointed out that Norges Bank was not fully utilizing the flexibility provided by the 
escape clauses in the mandate. Given the limitations of measures of core inflation, Norges Bank should also pay 
attention to other measures than CPI-ATE when deciding on its monetary policy stance. By exploring alternative 
measures of underlying inflation the interest rate setting would also be more robust. 
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graph in the monetary policy reports (see for instance, Chart 1.9 in MPR3/09). It is a bit 
unclear how these other indicators influence monetary policy, however. They are not subject 
to forecast, but are still useful in assessing the current inflation pressure.   
 
In MPR2/08, Norges Bank introduced a new indicator of underlying inflation called CPIXE. 
CPIXE measures CPI inflation adjusted for tax changes and excluding temporary fluctuations 
in energy prices. For an evaluation of this new measure, see Norges Bank Watch 2009.  The 
motivation for constructing CPIXE is that CPI-ATE does not capture trends in energy prices, 
since CPI-ATE permanently excludes energy. Given the strong increase in energy prices in 
recent years, Norges Bank was concerned that CPI-ATE may have undervalued the 
underlying inflation pressure in the Norwegian economy. Technically, the CPIXE is 
calculated as the CPI-ATE plus an estimated trend in energy prices in the CPI. The trend in 
energy prices is computed using the so called Hodrick-Prescott (HP) filter, see Norges Bank 
Staff Memo 3/2009 and 7/2008 for details. Norges Bank calculates CPIXE, and publishes the 
data on its webpage a few hours after Statistics Norway publishes CPI-ATE.  
 
When introducing this indicator in 2008, Norges Bank wrote:  
 
”Like the traditional indicators, the new indicator will not be a perfect measure of underlying 
inflation at all times [….] The assessment of underlying price pressures will therefore always 
have to be based on several different indicators and an analysis of the underlying reasons for 
the price changes.” (MPR2/08 p. 55) 
 
Although different indicators of underlying inflation may still be analysed, Norges Bank has 
in fact replaced CPI-ATE with CPIXE as their main indicator of underlying inflation. 
Therefore, detailed forecast with fan charts for CPI-ATE are no longer published by Norges 
Bank. Instead, forecasts of CPIXE (including fan charts) are constructed by conditioning on 
the Bank’s interest rate path. In that way, monetary policy now seeks to stabilize CPIXE 
instead of CPI-ATE (in their macro model NEMO).10  
 
NBW’s view:  
 
By focusing on CPIXE instead of CPI-ATE, Norges Bank has introduced a new main 
indicator of underlying inflation that they are targeting in their forecasting process. 
Although Norges Bank considers many indicators of underlying inflation to evaluate the 
current inflationary pressure, CPIXE is the only measure of underlying inflation for 
which they provide conditioned, detailed forecast (with fan charts).  
 
Norges Bank Watch 2009 recommended that Norges Banks should not publish CPIXE as its 
main indicator of underlying inflation. Their main concern was that the historical index values 
have to be revised as new observations of energy prices are added to the sample. Sometimes 
these revisions can be substantial. This is because the Hodrick-Prescott filter is an one-side 
filter, that will encounter endpoint problems. NBW 2009 also pointed out the CPIXE would 
be very sensitive to how they had predicted future energy prices. Relying too much on CPIXE 
as the main indicator of underlying inflation would therefore make monetary policy less 
robust according to this report.  
 
                                                 
10 To obtain the forecast for CPIXE Norges Bank condition on the forecast for the energy trend (constructed 
outside NEMO) by allowing for shocks in the AR equations. 
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Figure 7.1 illustrates the effect of the revisions due to new observations of energy prices. 
Panel A) graphs monthly observations of CPIXE in real time together with the final revised 
vintage of CPIXE in 2009. The monthly data for the real time values for CPIXE are taken 
from the MPR 3/09, whereas the final time (revised) values are taken from Norges Bank’s 
webpage, where they publish monthly updates. Panel B plots the difference between these two 
graphs. A positive number means that the first vintage was too high compared to the final 
values; hence the index numbers have been revised downward. Clearly there are at times large 
differences. In July 2008 for example, CPIXE was perceived to be 0.5 percentage points 
higher than what Norges Bank in December 2009 estimates CPIXE to have been in July 2008. 
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The downward revision is mainly due to the fact that since July 2008, oil prices have 
plummeted, causing a downward revision of the energy price trend.  
 
Figure 7.2. CPIXE (real time) and revised (final time) compared with CPI‐ATE 
 
 
Source: Norges Bank and Norges Bank Watch 2010 
 
 
In their monetary policy reports, Norges Bank publishes CPIXE calculated in real time. 
Hence, the effect of the revisions will be suppressed. The fall in inflation by the end of 2009 
noted in Figure 7.1 will therefore seem much steeper in the graphs published in the monetary 
policy report, since Norges Bank plots the real time series for CPIXE rather than the updated 
final time series. With the benefit of hindsight, we now know that the series has been revised 
down, hence this should be the relevant information that Norges Bank should publish in the 
reports.  
 
Note also that the difference between the (final time) CPIXE and CPI-ATE has declined in the 
last two years (see Figure 7.2). This feature disappears when investigating the real time 
CPIXE. Again, this is mainly due to the fact that since July 2008, oil prices have plummeted, 
reducing also the measured energy trend in CPIXE. This episode illustrates how sensitive this 
measure of underlying inflation is to inclusion of new data on energy prices.  
 
Finally, the impact of the downward revision for policy analysis can also be seen in Figure 
7.3, where we include the inflation forecast. The forecasts shown here are all identical to the 
forecasts graphed in Figure 3.3 in Chapter 3, the only difference is that now we use the final 
values of CPIXE for the period known at the time the forecast is given; (2006Q1-2009Q2), 
instead of the real time values used in MPR3/09.11 We denote this series MPR (rev) 3/09. 
Clearly, the forecast in MPR3/08 now seems out of place. At the time this forecast was given, 
CPIXE inflation was close to 3.5 percent. However, already by December 2008 when the 
updated forecasts were given, CPIXE had been revised downwards. Hence, the forecast in 
December start out at a much lower level, even though the forecast was given just one month 
after the previous MPR3/08 forecast.  
                                                 
11 We have averaged the monthly data published in the figures 7.1.-7.2 to quarterly frequencies.  
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Figure 7.3. Forecast of CPIXE, MPR 3/09 with revised final numbers for actual CPIXE.  
 
 
Source: Norges Bank and NBW 2010. 
 
 
NBW’s view:  
 
If Norges Bank continues to publish CPIXE in their monetary policy reports, we 
recommend that the final numbers are published as they are revised, not the real time 
values that does not incorporate recent revisions. This is Norges Bank’s practice when 
publishing the output gap. Given that the final revised values of CPIXE will always be 
uncertain by construction, Norges Bank should also extend the fan charts back in time 
to reflect this uncertainty, as is customary in the Bank’s graphs for the output gap.  
 
 
Another problematic issue related to CPIXE is that both the process of defining and 
measuring underlying inflation is delegated to Norges Bank, while previously it was Statistics 
Norway that published underlying inflation (CPI-ATE). As both processes involve elements 
of judgment, it becomes difficult to argue that the measure serves both policy purposes and 
makes policy accountable at the same time. The NBW committee does not, however, claim 
that that the problems associated with CPIXE are solved if Norges Bank leaves it to Statistics 
Norway to compute and publish CPIXE. Statistics Norway has concluded (see Sandberg 
2008) that only CPI-ATE (and CPI-AT) will be included in their portfolio of official price 
statistics published each month. In this article, Sandberg argues that when CPI-ATE was 
chosen as the main indicator of underlying inflation in 2001, it was emphasized that it was 
important that an independent institution like Statistics Norway could produce and publish the 
operational target used in monetary policy as their official statistics. CPI-ATE was seen as a 
transparent indicator consistent with the mandate. Other indicators could be useful 
supplements, and some of these could be calculated by Statistics Norway on request 
(Sandberg, 2008).  
 
"Ved utarbeidelsen av KPI-JA og KPI-JAE i 2001 ble det pekt på viktigheten av at 
Statistisk sentralbyrå som uavhengig institusjon produserte og publiserte det operative 
målet for pengepolitikken som offisiell statistikk. I dialogen som Statistisk sentralbyrå 
60 
 
hadde med sentrale brukere inkludert myndighetene fremkom det klart et behov for én 
sentral indikator, og valget falt på konsumprisindeksen justert for avgiftsendringer og 
uten energivarer. Dette ga en transparent indikator i tråd med forskriften. Andre 
indikatorer kan imidlertid utgjøre et supplement for ulike ekspertbrukere. Siden noen 
av disse allerede beregnes på oppdrag kan de selvsagt også utleveres til andre ved 
forespørsel."  
 
Through the present Norges Bank Watch group’s dialogues with Statistics Norway, this 
viewpoint was clearly still maintained. Furthermore, as the construction of CPIXE involves 
judgment and revision of history, it does not make it a transparent indicator that Statistics 
Norway would normally produce. We therefore conclude that the previously used index of 
underlying inflation, CPI-ATE should still be used as the main measure of underlying 
inflation since it has been tested, evaluated and has good properties at least compared to other 
alternative measures of underlying inflation.  
 
NBW’s view: 
  
As last year Norges Bank Watch committee, we think Norges Bank should not use 
CPIXE as it is not an optimal and transparent indicator of underlying inflation using 
standard criteria. CPIXE should therefore not be used as the main indicator when 
designing monetary policy. Our view is that CPI-ATE should still be used as the focus 
measure, but that Norges Bank should use more judgment when they observe deviations 
between CPI and CPIATE in periods of rapid energy prices. 
 
We would, however, like to state that our critique refers primarily to the use of CPIXE as the 
main indicator of underlying inflation. As Norges Bank, we believe energy price changes can 
have an impact on the underlying inflation level, although the pass-through (the extent to 
which changes in oil prices affects underlying inflation) may have declined somewhat over 
time, see e.g. Hooker (2002) and Chen (2009) for international comparisons and Cappelen, 
Eika and Olsen (2006), Bjørnland (2000, 2009) and Solheim (2008) for analysis of Norway. 
To learn more about the importance of pass-through from energy prices to inflation, we 
suggest that Norges Bank conduct a more detailed empirical analysis. 
 
Furthermore, we recommend that Norges Bank investigate alternative methods of separating 
the permanent and transitory component of energy prices using for instance a structural VAR 
method, panel data analysis or factor models, see e.g. Hahn (2003), Giannone and Matheson 
(2007) and Landau and Skudelny (2009) among many others.  
 
NBW view: 
 
We recommend that Norges Bank analyses the pass-through from oil prices to inflation 
in Norway, to better evaluate how energy prices influence underlying inflation.  We also 
recommend that Norges Bank investigate whether there are other more suitable 
methods of separating the permanent and transitory component of energy prices, than 
the Hodrick-Prescott filter that they are currently using.  
 
 
7.2. Analysis of the current situation – Regional network 
In autumn 2002, Norges Bank established a regional network of enterprises, organizations and 
local authorities throughout Norway. The idea was to construct a survey by talking to business 
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and community leaders concerning expected financial developments in their enterprises and 
industries. The contacts reflect the production side of the economy, both in terms of industry 
sector and geographic area.  
 
The network divides Norway into seven regions. Based on the reports from the regions 
following each round of contacts, Norges Bank publishes a national summary and charts. The 
summary was up until 2008 a pure region average. From Regional Network report no. 3/2009, 
the observation in the regional Network has been improved by constructing the weights 
differently see Martinsen and Wulfsberg (2009). The new weights better capture the variation 
in size between the different regions over time than previously. The economic developments 
reported are published regularly and made available on Norges Bank’s website. 
 
Norges Bank has emphasized that the insight from the enterprises in the network, together 
with the regular reports on economic developments, makes the regional network an important 
factor in decision-making by Norges Bank’s Executive Board in its conduct of monetary 
policy. Regular interviews with contacts in Norwegian industry are used to obtain information 
about enterprises’ view of the current situation and outlook before other official statistics are 
available. In a recent study, Brekke and Halvorsen (2009) analyses how information from the 
regional network correlates with other official statistics on growth, capacity utilization, 
employment etc. They find that the network is highly correlated with economic activity. 
Hence, we conclude that there is clearly useful information in the regional networks in 
assessing current macroeconomic conditions. In that sense, the regional network may provide 
a clear signal about developments in the Norwegian economy.  
 
Furthermore, we find that the regional network may also enhance the understanding of the 
dynamics within and between sectors. This may give Norges Bank a better insight into what is 
driving current economic developments. We draw the attention to many recent interesting 
analysis based on information from the regional network, for instance, the short article on 
“Competition and Prices” in MPR1/07 and the one on “Developments in Productivity 
Growth”, published in MPR2/07. 
 
The ability to forecast well 3-6 months ahead is less certain. In particular, we find some 
evidence that it is more of a coincident indicator than a leading indicator.  Looking back at the 
reports since 2008, it was only in the fifth report published in December 2008 that the survey 
indicated a severe fall in activity six months ahead. Prior to that, there had been signals of 
weaker growth prospect from the third report (published June 24, 2008) and onwards. 
However, the index was still positive in June, not yet indicating a future fall in output (see 
Figure 7.4).  
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Figure 7.4. The regional Network for Norway (obtained in June 2009) 
 
 
However, with the benefit of hindsight, we know now that the (quarter on quarter, s.a.) 
growth rates for mainland GDP turned negative already by the third quarter of 2008 (see 
Figure 2.1 in Chapter 2). Other indicators had pointed to a fall in activity prior to that, see for 
instance the business survey tendency published by Statistics Norway and OECD composite 
leading indicator for Norway graphed in Figure 7.5 here. 
 
 
Figure 7.5. OECD Composite leading indicator for Norway 
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A simple evaluation of the network compared to some alternative forecasting models is 
provided in Figure 7.6 and 7.7. Figure 7.6 displays the forecasts two quarters ahead from the 
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regional network together with the normalized annual growth in GDP mainland Norway.12 
The Figure is an adaption from Figure 17 in Brekke and Halvorsen (2009). Figure 7.7 reveals 
that the forecast series from the Regional Network seems to lag output slightly, both in the 
booming years from 2003/2004 and in the recession towards the end of 2008, which is 
consistent with what we have argued just above. Correlation coefficients reported in Brekke 
and Halvorsen (2009) also suggest that the maximum correlation between the forecast series 
from the regional network and GDP is found when the two series are coinciding, and not 
when the regional network is leading GDP.  
 
Figure 7.6 Forecast from the Regional Network and a random walk, compared with GDP, 
2003Q1‐2009Q1. 
  
Source: Norges Bank and NBW 2010. 
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Figure  7.7  Forecast  from  the  Regional  Network  and  the  Business  Tendency  Survey, 
compared with GDP, 2003Q1‐2009Q1. 
  
Source: Norges Bank and NBW 2010. 
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12 GDP is normalized to be the same as the regional network in 2007Q2. This does not, however, influence the 
results.  
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In the figure we also plot forecast from a random walk. To be consistent with the regional 
network, the forecasts are two quarter ahead forecasts. This is the simplest form of a forecast, 
stating that the forecast for GDP at time t+2 is equal to actual GDP at time t.  Figure 7.7 is 
identical to Figure 7.6, except that now we replace the random walk with the Business 
Tendency Survey calculated in Statistics Norway. 
 
Evaluating the forecast performance by the root mean square error (RMSE), we find that the 
RMSE for regional network is 0.80 while RMSE for the random walk is 0.65 and for the 
Business Tendency Survey is 0.69. Hence, the forecast from the random walk and the 
Business Tendency Survey both outperform forecast from the regional network, in this period. 
Given the short sample, though, these numbers should be interpreted with care. 
 
Hence, we have argued that the network provides an signal about current economic 
developments in Norway, but that it may not be best indicator for forecasting 3-6 months 
ahead, as it seems to be more of a coincident rather than a leading indicator.13 One reason 
why the network may not be the best forecaster in this recession is that it focuses on the 
supply side. The production side in the economy was only affected when the financial crisis 
affected confidence though changes in banking and financial institutions lending practice. As 
emphasized in chapter 2, private consumption and house prices declined already in the spring 
of 2008, half a year before the financial turmoil in the fall. Hence, measured from the demand 
side, there were by then clearer signals of a fall in activity than the network provided in the 
spring 2008.  
 
However, to evaluate the forecasting power of the network any further than this requires us to 
assess forecasting performance systematically over time. Given the amount of resources that 
are put into constructing the indicator, as well as the weight that is given to the network in the 
monetary policy reports, we suggest that the forecasting power of the regional network is 
systematically assessed and compared to other leading indicators such as Statistic Norway 
business tendency survey. 
 
 
NBW’s view:  
 
There is clearly useful information in the regional networks in assessing current 
macroeconomic conditions. In that sense, the regional network may provide a clear 
signal about developments in the Norwegian economy before data are published. The 
regional network may also enhance the understanding of the dynamics within and 
between sectors. This may give Norges Bank a better insight into what is driving current 
economic developments. The ability of the network to forecast aggregate economic 
activity 3-6 months ahead is less clear, as it seems to be a coincident rather than leading 
indicator. Given the amount of resources that are put into constructing the indicator, we 
suggest that the forecasting power of the regional network is systematically assessed and 
compared to other leading indicators such as Statistic Norway business tendency survey. 
 
                                                 
13 That said, information from the regional network has also been used together with other relevant information 
in econometric models in Norges Bank to improve forecast of GDP. However, we have not evaluated these 
combined forecasts. 
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7.3 Short term (nowcast) forecast 
In recent years it has become increasingly common among central banks to combine different 
models or forecasts. Rather than arrive at a single specification, one entertains a wide variety 
of models and then weights together the output from these models in a systematic manner. 
Starting in 2006, Norges Bank initiated a project to improve its short-term forecasting using 
statistical and econometric models.14 The short term forecasting project (the ‘Nowcasting’ 
project) aimed at producing model-based short term forecasts for the Norwegian economy for 
each round of monetary policy discussions. These forecasts are unconditional forecasts. At the 
heart of the evaluation and combination of short-term forecasts at the Norges Bank is a set of 
programs collectively referred to as SAM – the System for Averaging Models.  
 
The (staff) forecasts from SAM are published in every monetary policy report, starting with 
MPR 2/2008 which also describes the project briefly. The forecasts are published together 
with the official forecast, three quarters ahead, see for instance Chart 2.9 and 2.12 in MPR 
3/2009 depicted in Figure 7.8 here. 
 
More recently, the forecast have been supplemented with fan charts that communicate the 
degree of forecast uncertainty. Models can then be combined based on the forecast 
uncertainty, i.e. not only based on point forecast. This ensures that point forecasts that have 
wide confidence bands get a lower weight than models with narrow confidence bands.  
 
 
Figure 7.8. Forecast for CPI-ATE and Mainland GDP using SAM compared to Norges Bank 
short term forecast published in MPR3/09. 
 
   
 
 
An important part of the project was to evaluate the forecasts obtained from a broad spectrum 
of models, and to consider whether particular combinations of models or forecasts 
combination improve short-term forecasts of the Norwegian economy. Bjørnland, Gerdrup, 
Jore, Smith and Thorsrud (2009) show that with regard to CPI-ATE, SAM adds value to the 
official forecast from Norges Bank. The results also illustrate that, for the period 2001-2009, 
SAM's forecast outperform Norges Bank's forecast up to a horizon of one year. More recently, 
Gerdrup, Jore, Smith and Thorsrud (2009) evaluate density combinations and show that 
                                                 
14 Hilde C. Bjørnland, member of NBW 2010, was directly involved in the nowcasting project from December 
2007 to June 2008. 
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forecast performance can be further improved by combining groups of similar model 
(ensemble) densities, rather than individual model densities.  
 
Regarding publishing schedule, the forecasts are updated each month when new data for CPI-
ATE are published and again when data for quarterly GDP are published, giving a total of 16 
updates each year. Regarding the transparency of these forecasts, the forecasts are distributed 
internally and to the Executive board.  
 
Since these forecasts are part of the information distributed and discussed in the executive 
board at the monetary policy meetings, we recommend that Norges Bank publishes them 
regularly, preferably after each monetary policy meeting. Although these forecasts are not the 
official forecast from Norges Bank, short term technical (staff) forecasts provide valuable 
information about unexpected shocks that affect monetary policy outcomes. Publishing them 
will only enhance Norges Bank’s transparency. 
 
 
NBW’s view: 
 
Norges Bank has the last few years developed and implemented forecasting methods of 
model combinations used in the monetary policy operations. This work is encouraging 
and we recommend that Norges Bank continues to develop, test and evaluate these 
forecasting tools both for point forecasts and densities. Furthermore, as last years 
Norges Bank Watch group, we recommend that Norges Bank publishes the short term 
forecast regularly, at least after each monetary policy meeting.  
 
We also suggest that the forecast horizon be extended to 2-3 years.  The forecasts can be 
published together with the regular forecast update from NEMO. That way the unconditional 
forecast from SAM can serve as useful cross checks for the forecast from NEMO, which are 
conditional on the interest rate (see also the discussion in the next section).  
 
NBW’s view: 
 
We suggest that the forecasts for GDP and inflation (CPIATE) are extended to the two 
years horizon and used as cross check against Norges Banks model (NEMO) forecasts.  
 
 
7.4. Analysis of the medium and long term using NEMO  
The last few years, Norges Bank has made impressive progress in developing a small 
structural model, called NEMO. This model is an open economy Dynamic Stochastic General 
Equilibrium (DSGE) model that builds on the New Keynesian framework for modeling the 
macroeconomic effects of monetary policy. The development of NEMO has required highly 
trained macroeconomists with a strong modeling culture coupled with statistical, econometric 
and programming skills. The model has been in use for policy analysis and forecasting since 
the Monetary Policy Report  3/07.  
 
As previous Norges Bank Watch groups, we support Norges Bank’s efforts to build a 
structural model that also captures the effects of monetary policy through the expectations of 
market participants of future monetary policy. However, as with any model, there is always 
room for improvement. For example, the recent financial crisis has pointed to some severe 
deficiencies in NEMO and many other DSGE models with respect to credit markets and asset 
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prices, resulting in severe forecast failures. In the following we will discuss the potential for 
improving forecast from NEMO, before discussing if asset prices and oil prices could be part 
of the model framework.15  
 
NEMO is a micro founded DSGE model which implies that market agents make optimal 
decisions under uncertainty, subject to realistic expectations of the macroeconomy as well as 
future monetary policy decision. The decisions of households and firms are aggregated into 
dynamics general equilibrium. In forming their expectations agents take into account all 
available information, including the stochastic processes of shocks that might hit the 
economy, the behaviour of other agents and the expected course of monetary policy. The 
current parameterisation of NEMO is based on calibration and Bayesian estimation. For more 
details, see Brubakk et al. (2006). 
 
Overall, DSGE models like NEMO offer a lot of potential for monetary policy making. They 
can help identify source of shocks and predict the effect of policy changes. The DSGE models 
also allow one to establish a link between structural features of the economy and reduced 
form parameters, something that was not always possible with large-scale macroeconomic 
models that previously were used by central banks. 
 
A typical critique of DSGE models is that they are too stylized to be truly able to describe 
successfully the dynamics of the data, see Sims (2006). Clearly, that can be said for any 
structural model that by construction has to abstract from a lot of empirical details that are not 
conceived as sufficiently important for the main analytical purpose of the model. However, 
there are some inherent features of the DSGE models that make them too stylized in their 
treatment of financial markets and asset markets in particular. At the outset, DSGE models are 
highly non-linear and can not be solved analytically. Therefore, linear approximations around 
a steady state were used to permit detailed analysis, but such approximations also restricted 
applications of the models to large shocks such as those released by the recent, global 
financial crisis.  
 
When estimated on data, DSGE models are also stripped of irregularities by using suitable 
data transformations, such as de-trending, smoothing or the elimination of structural breaks. 
As a consequence, DSGE models are not designed to predict sudden drops in activity (crisis). 
They are useful for “normal” times as a way of understanding economic fluctuations, and for 
learning about optimal policy.  
 
The financial crisis has emphasized the need for good forecasting models that can divert from 
a stylized linearized world. Norges Bank has already developed many such models, either in 
the short term econometric forecasting project (SAM) discussed above or as part of ongoing 
research in the Research Department, see for instance the paper Hoogerheide, Kelijn, 
Ravazzolo, van Dijk and Verbeek (2010) that show promising results in terms of forecasting 
both macroeconomic and financial variables using econometric (non-linear) methods.  
 
Hence, Norges Bank already possesses many econometric models than can be extended to 
make forecast 2-3 years ahead. In order to improve future forecasts, we suggest that Norges 
Bank should use empirically validated econometric models (including simple time-series 
models) systematically as cross checks when making forecast from NEMO. Although the 
models may be unconditional on the future interest path, they can still provide the 
                                                 
15 See Norges Bank Watch 2008 for a more in depth evaluation of NEMO. 
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policymaker with useful information as the forecast will be an extrapolation of recurrent 
conditions.16  
 
Note, however, that simple econometric models, like unrestricted VARs, may have an 
advantage in forecasting compared to DSGE models.17 As a result, it may not be surprising 
that the former will generally outperform the latter when forecasting. However, we believe 
that the approach of reporting forecast from the DSGE model side-by-side with econometric 
models, offers transparency about the NEMO strengths and weaknesses. This will help the 
policymaker make better decisions. 
 
NBW view: 
 
We support Norges Bank’s efforts in terms of building a theoretically consistent 
structural model of the Norwegian economy, for evaluating monetary policy alternatives 
in the medium and long term. To strengthen its forecast properties, we recommend that 
Norges Bank should use empirically validated econometric models systematically as 
cross checks when making forecast from NEMO. This will offer transparency about the 
models strengths and weaknesses.  
 
 
 
7.5. Financial frictions 
The credit market liberalisation process of the 1980s increased the scope of spillovers from 
asset prices, and in particular house prices to the wider economy in many countries including 
Norway; see IMF (2008, 2009).  Furthermore, the liberalisation also made house prices more 
responsive to monetary policy shocks, as emphasized by Iacoviello and Minetti (2003). The 
importance of house prices in the business cycle may therefore have increased.  
 
Bjørnland and Jacobsen (2010) analyze empirically the role of house prices in the business 
cycle and the monetary transmission mechanism in Norway, Sweden and the UK, using a 
structural vector autoregressive (VAR) model. They find that the effects of house price 
innovations are non-trivial. In particular, housing contributes around 4-6 percent of GDP 
variation in all countries, with the largest effect seen in the UK. Concerning inflation, housing 
explains 10-15 percent of the variation, with Norway and UK experiencing the most 
pronounced effect. Finally, they also find house prices influence the (three-month) interest 
rate response in all countries, most notable in the UK. Interest rates in Norway also eventually 
respond to house price shocks, but the immediate response is small and not significant.  
 
The different role that house prices play in the business cycles could be related to issues 
regarding the mortgage market and the accessibility of credit. Two recent studies, IMF (2008) 
and Assenmacher-Wesche and Gerlach (2008), assess a series of indicators for credit 
accessibility and the mortgage market in several OECD-countries. The latter study finds that 
Norway, Sweden and the UK have fairly similar mortgage credit accessibility. However, 
Norway and the UK have higher owner-occupier and mortgage-debt-to-GDP ratios than 
                                                 
16 Related to this approach is of course the Del Negro and Schorfheide’s (2004) DSGE-VAR approach.  
 
17 That said, some DSGE models can also provide good forecast in certain periods. For instance, Smets and 
Wouters (2003) found that DSGE models could track and forecast time series as well as, and sometimes better 
than, a vector autoregression estimated with Bayesian techniques (BVAR). 
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Sweden, suggesting that house price shocks can have a stronger influence on real activity and 
inflation in Norway and the UK, than in Sweden.  
 
In the wake of the financial crisis, many central banks have come to realize that some 
simplifications embedded in popular DSGE models developed before the crisis make it 
difficult or impossible for these models to account for the role of asset prices and quantities in 
the business cycle.  It is important to note that this critique is  not the same as the observation 
that existing DSGE models ‘assume away’ asset market bubbles.  While that is indeed true, it 
is also the case that virtually all DSGE models in use before the crisis ‘assumed away’ 
financial frictions more generally and ignored the role of asset quantities, leverage, and 
collateral constraints which can be crucial influences on the business cycle even when asset 
prices are ‘rational’ and fully  explained by ‘fundamentals’ that include a realistic set of asset 
market variables. 
 
As many central banks, including Norges, rely heavily on DSGE models in assessing policy 
scenarios, the appropriate role of asset prices and quantities in these models has also received 
a great deal of attention.  In the view of Cecchetti, Disyatat and Kohler (2009) of the BIS 
 
[B]oth gross and net quantities of financial assets and liabilities matter for 
real activity. This is surely new, as nothing like this appears in modern 
mainstream macroeconomic models. What place should gross financial 
quantities have in macroeconomic models? For financial instruments, the 
amount outstanding, as well as the capital and collateral backing them, 
matter; for financial markets, the amount of trading, and the platform on 
which the trading occurs, matter; for financial institutions, their size and that 
of their counterparties matter; and for central banks, the size and composition 
of both sides of their balance sheet matter. .. We need to study the past with a 
much more critical eye. Economics is fundamentally about history. It is about 
the interplay between modeling and data. But we have missed something truly 
fundamental: financial crises are frequent events. In the past 25 years, there 
have on average been three or four banking crises every year (Reinhart and 
Rogoff (2008)). Rather than seeing financial crises as rare and one-off, we 
need models that deal with financial crises as regular events.8 This leads us to 
the central task macroeconomists face: we need to build macroeconomic 
models that create severe financial stress endogenously. If financial crises are 
just “bad luck” – the result of an exogenous shock that comes along 
regardless of the framework of the financial system or policy measures that 
have been put in place – then there is little we can do about them. But if, as we 
strongly suspect, financial crises are endogenous to the economy, recurring 
naturally, then we must build a new generation of macroeconomic models that 
take account of the linkages between the financial system, the real economy 
and the potential actions of policymakers. (Cecchetti, Disyatat and Kohler 
(2009), pp. 3-4). 
 
Charles Bean, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England makes a similar point: 
 
We need to put credit back into macroeconomics in a meaningful way. 
Financial intermediaries are conspicuous by their absence in the workhorse 
New Keynesian/New Classical DSGE model. The focus is on intrinsic 
dynamics resulting from inter-temporal decision-making in the face of a 
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variety of adjustment costs and impediments to price adjustment; there are no 
financial frictions to speak of. That such a framework has developed is 
unsurprising in the light of the Great Inflation and its subsequent Great 
Moderation. But the fact that financial intermediation plays a negligible role 
in Mike Woodford's magisterial state-of-the-art opus, Interest and Prices, 
speaks volumes. (Bean (2009), pp. 26 – 27). 
 
Although there is an influential theoretical literature on the credit channel of monetary policy 
(Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997, Benanke, Gertler and Gilchrist, 1999, Iacoviello, 2005),  for a 
variety of reasons these mechanisms were largely absent from DSGE models at central banks 
at the time of the financial crisis.   In these models, asset markets are often assumed to be 
complete , asset prices are redundant as they are completely pinned down by exogenous 
fundamentals (productivity, time preference) and asset quantities are irrelevant.  The 
Modigliani-Miller theorem holds, which implies that balance sheet positions do not affect real 
decisions.  The monetary transmission mechanism is simplified to focus on a path for the 
short term interest rate which influences’ consumption and investment directly without any 
role for financial intermediation either via bank or the security markets.   
 
Research efforts at prominent central banks and international organizations such at the ECB 
and the IMF  have commenced active programs to model and include realistic  financial 
frictions in DSGE models used for policy analysis.  Notable contributions include Christiano, 
Motto, and Rostagno’s (2009) work at the ECB and Kannan, Rabanal, and Scott (2010) 
research at the IMF.  An important feature that Norges Bank should seek to include in its 
DSGE model is a Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) financial accelerator mechanism 
that works through housing finance in addition to firms’ capital investment financing 
requirement as intermediated through banks.  This is important for Norway given that housing 
loans are intermediated and held by the banking sector with interest rates that adjust in a 
timely manner to the policy rate.  As with business credit, which is also held by banks in the 
form of direct loans and not so much by corporate bond holders or holders of securitized 
structures, leverage ratios and credit spreads  are key variables in the monetary transmission 
mechanism that need to be modeled to asses the impact of different policy paths on the 
economy as well as the scope and scale of fluctuations in inflation and the output gap from 
shocks to the financial sector.    
 
Fortunately, the model group at Norges Bank is quite capable and is actively working on 
adding financial frictions to their DSGE policy models.  In the judgment of the committee, we 
would encourage the staff to build on and refine as appropriate the modeling approach 
pursued by Kannan, Rabanal, and Scott (2010) at the IMF (WEO Chapter 3) which explicitly 
and tractably incorporates housing finance in a DSGE model and also the work of Christiano, 
Motto, and Rostagno’s (2009) work at the ECB which incorporates a Bernanke Gertler 
Gilchrist financial accelerator for business investment.  
 
NBW view: 
 
Leverage ratios and credit spreads are key variables in the monetary transmission 
mechanism that need to be modeled to asses the impact of different policy paths on the 
economy as well as the scope and scale of fluctuations in inflation and the output gap 
from shocks to the financial sector.    
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7.6. The oil price and wealth effects 
Higher oil prices may affect an energy producing economy in two ways. 1) Through positive 
income and wealth effects, and 2) through negative trade effects. Regarding the first channel, 
higher oil prices represent an immediate transfer of wealth from oil importers to oil exporters. 
If this income is transmitted back to the economy, then higher oil prices would be expected to 
lead to higher levels of economic activity, in a similar way as for other asset prices. In 
particular, asset prices; and stock prices in particular will be affected by the price of oil, 
through the cash flow of oil related firms. Asset prices may then influence consumption and 
investments and, moreover, increase a firm’s ability to fund operations (the so called credit 
channel). Hence, asset prices may be an important transmission channel of wealth in an oil 
abundant country.   
 
The effect in the medium to long term will, however, depend on what the oil producers (i.e. 
governments) do with the additional income. If this income is used to purchase goods and 
services in their own country, higher oil prices can generate a temporary increase in activity in 
the domestic economy. Hence, overall national wealth and demand increase. The potential for 
profitable output from the energy sector can also provide huge investment and business 
opportunities in the overall economy, with increased demand for labour and capital. However, 
the high level of activity may put upward pressures on inflation and on the domestic currency, 
which often appreciates in oil exporting countries (see Haldane, 1997). Eventually, this can 
lead to a crowding out of the manufacturing production as discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
Regarding the second channel, the negative trade effect, as the oil importing trading partners 
will suffer an oil induced recession, they will demand less export of traditional goods and 
services from the oil exporting countries. To the extent that the oil exporting country has a 
large export sector, this channel may provide a negative stimulus to the oil exporting 
countries.  
 
The net effect of the two channels remains uncertain. Further, empirical studies of the effects 
of oil price changes in oil exporting countries are not unequivocal. For instance, Bjørnland 
(2000, 2009), Jiménez-Rodríguez and Sánchez (2005) and Solheim (2008) find that whereas 
Norway so far has benefited from increased oil prices, displaying temporary higher 
consumption and output growth rates, other oil exporting countries like the UK and Canada 
have behaved more in line with oil importing countries, showing declining growth rates. As 
was discussed in Chapter 5, more recently there is also a concern that higher oil prices has 
lead to higher government spending, high labor cost, real exchange rate appreciation ann a 
loss of competitiveness in the non-oil tradable sector.  
 
In their model NEMO, Norges Bank does not model the energy sector nor include oil prices. 
Petroleum investment is included, but is modeled as an exogenous process. To obtain 
forecast, Norges Bank assumes that oil investment follows an autoregressive process. Norges 
Bank also use judgment to obtain short term forecast that one can condition on in NEMO. 
Fiscal policy is modeled in the same way. It is an exogenous variable in NEMO, and the 
forecast is given in the same way assuming autoregressive processes for the shocks. Judgment 
is also used to allow fiscal policy to reflect the forecast in the National Budget.  
We suggest that Norges Bank should assess the value added of having oil prices into NEMO.  
As described above, oil prices may have large wealth effects that may influence consumption 
and investment, in a similar way that any asset price. Furthermore, since oil revenue now 
constitutes a large component of total government revenue, fiscal policy will be affected in 
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the long run by changes in the oil price (see Chapter 5). We acknowledge that this mechanism 
is difficult to model, and suggest Norges Bank start by empirically validate (or refute) the 
importance of the oil price for consumption and investment.  
 
NBW view: 
 
We suggest that Norges Bank explore the importance of the oil price for aggregate 
demand and include the oil price explicitly in NEMO.  Oil price changes may have large 
wealth effects that are likely to influence consumption and investment. Furthermore, 
since oil revenue now constitutes a large component of total government revenue, fiscal 
policy will be affected in the long run by changes in the oil price.  
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